**MCCMOS Circular**

# Marine Air Ground Task Force
# Civil-Military Operations Planning

## Marine Corps Civil-Military Operations School
## (MCCMOS)

**U.S. Marine Corps**

**June 2020**

This circular supports the academic curricula of all MCCMOS Civil Affairs and Civil-Military Operations Programs of Instruction

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Throughout this circular, masculine nouns and pronouns are used for the sake of simplicity. Except where otherwise noted, these nouns and pronouns apply to either gender

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5 June 2020

# FOREWORD

Marine Corps Civil-Military Operations School (MCCMOS) Circular, *Marine Air Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations Planning*, is designed to clarify the role of a CMO Planner and/or CMO Working Group in the execution of operational planning and in support of the MAGTF OPT, with regard to the impact of the civil dimension throughout the MCPP and execution of military operations.

The overall purpose of this circular is to support MCCMOS programs of instruction with a more complete reference until such time that an update to civil-military operations-related publications are approved by the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration.

MCCMOS publications and applicable Marine Corps civil affairs doctrinal information is accessible at https://www.trngcmd.marines.mil/Units/Northeast/Weapons-Training-Battalion/-MCCMOS/

Recommendations for improvements to this pamphlet are encouraged from commands and individuals. The enclosed User Suggestion Form can be reproduced and forwarded to:

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

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# CHAPTER 1

# MARINE CORPS PLANNING PROCESS OVERVIEW

*"Planning is the art and science of envisioning a desired future and laying out effective ways of bringing it about."*

— Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 5, *Planning*

## 1000. Civil Considerations

In today's complex operational environment (OE), commanders are challenged with preparing the force to operate in a battlespace shared by adversaries and a multitude of civilian actors engaged in the full spectrum of human activity. Across the competition continuum and throughout the range of military operations, Marine Corps commanders must understand and determine how best to engage the civilian populace to accomplish their missions. The need to deconflict and coordinate military and civilian activity within the same space is essential to the success of military operations, while mitigating disruption to civilian activities. As such, military decision-makers must consider the civil dimension of the battlespace during the planning and conduct of operations.

*"This means that they understand their commander's overall intent and they know their job is to do whatever is necessary to fulfill that intent."*

— *Robert Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War*

This circular provides a framework from which to understand, plan, and conduct civil-military operations (CMO) and provides a doctrinal basis for integrating civil considerations into the planning process.

The Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) conducts CMO to coordinate civil and military activities, minimize civil-military friction, mitigate threats from the civil component, maximize support for operations, and meet the commander's legal and ethical obligations to the civilians within the OE. CMO are an inherent command responsibility. They encompass the actions MAGTF commanders take to establish and maintain relations with civil authorities, the general population, and other organizations. As a part of unified action, MAGTF commanders are responsible for the organization and centralized direction of CMO in their battlespace.

## 1001. Introduction to Planning

Planning must support the commander's decision making. MCDP 5, *Planning,* describes planning as an essential part of the broader field of command and control, which enhances the commander's ability to make sound and timely decisions. Effective decision making requires both the situational understanding to recognize the essence of a given problem and the creative ability to devise a practical solution. Hence, an essential function of planning is to promote an understanding of the problem—the difference between existing and desired conditions—and to devise ways to solve it. Planning involves elements of both art and science, combining analysis and calculation with intuition, inspiration, and creativity.

Planning should never be viewed as an isolated activity or process. Not only is planning a critical element of command and control but planning along with execution and assessment comprise the operations process. The three are inseparable. By that, planning is the basis for execution while assessment determines how and why the environment has changed as a result of execution, which then informs subsequent planning and assessment. While that description suggests a sequence to the relationship, these three essential military activities are cyclical in nature. Once underway, they have no beginning or end. Individually and collectively, they interact and evolve over time through countless, interrelated events.

## 1002. Understanding the Operational Environment

Understanding the operational environment is essential to the planning and decision-making processes. Identifying significant characteristics in the battlespace and their potential effects on friendly operations by analyzing specific areas, such as physical environment and infrastructure, individuals and groups, culture, and instability and stability dynamics. CMO planners are specifically trained to assess the civil environment, identify civil considerations, and integrate them throughout the planning process and execution. It is also important to consider the details of the human terrain, as a defining element of the urban area and for its effect on the geography of the urban area. The MAGTF will continue to use OCOKA-W to guide its planning in regard to the physical terrain. consider the details of the human terrain, as a defining element of the urban area and for its effect on the geography of the urban area. We will continue to use OCOKA-W to guide our planning in regards to the physical terrain. CMO planners conduct civil preparation of the battlespace (CPB) prior to an operation to develop operational context and continues through execution.

## 1003. Planning Hierarchy

As described in MCDP 5, the highest level of the planning hierarchy is conceptual planning. Functional and detailed planning are the other two levels. Conceptual planning is a process of creative synthesis supported by analysis. Developing tactical, operational, or strategic concepts for the overall conduct of military actions are examples of conceptual planning.

- Conceptual planning provides the basis for all subsequent planning and should progress from general to the specific.
- While the commander is engaged in both functional and detailed planning, the specific aspects of these are usually developed by the planners and staff. The commander directs the formulation of plans at the conceptual planning level.

## 1004. The Marine Corps Planning Process

The Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP), as outlined in MCDP 5, supports the Marine Corps warfighting philosophy of maneuver warfare. It also helps promote a common understanding of the operational environment and the problem as a basis for action. For Marine units with staffs, MCPP is a proven, battle-tested approach to planning. MCPP is a six-step process (Problem Framing, Course of Action (COA) Development, COA War Game, COA Comparison and Decision, Orders Development, and Transition), guided by three tenants: top-down planning, single battle concept, and integrated planning.

## 1005. Tenets of the Marine Corps Planning Process

MCDP 5 identifies three tenets, which guide the commander's use of his staff to plan and conduct operations.

- **Top-Down Planning**. Planning is a fundamental responsibility of command. The commander's personal involvement throughout the planning process provides the foundation for decentralized execution. Although the commander's guidance and intent drive the process, commanders require support from others. The goal of the staff and operational planning team (OPT) and associated working groups is to increase the commander's understanding of the environment, the problem, and to inform decision making.

- **Single Battle Concept**. Conceptually the battlespace can be divided spatially into three parts: deep, close, and rear. Operations and or events in one part of the battlespace often have profound and unintended effects in other areas and events. Therefore, a commander must always view the battlespace as an indivisible entity. Everyone involved must bear in mind that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. By providing the big picture to subordinate units, they may exercise judgment and initiative when the unforeseen occurs, while remaining consistent with the commander's intent (the commander's expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired end state).

- **Integrated Planning**. Integrated planning is the coordinated action toward a common purpose by all elements of the force. The intent of integrated planning is to share

information across warfighting functions and support organizations to achieve a common goal. Essential to this principle is the assignment of personnel with an appropriate level of knowledge in their respective organization or functional area to the OPT/working group. The concept assumes that the experience of a group of functional experts will lead to a better plan than a commander can develop independently.

## 1006. The Six Steps of the Marine Corps Planning Process

Each step of MCPP (Figure 1-1) is critical to understanding the situation, determining the root cause of the problem, and the options for solving the identified problem.

- **Step 1. Problem Framing**. Problem Framing uses a design methodology supported by staff actions to enhance the understanding of the operational environment and the nature of the problem. Problem Framing identifies what the command must accomplish, when and where it must be done and, most importantly, why—the purpose of the operation.

- **Step 2. Course of Action Development**. During course of action (COA) development, planners produce options for accomplishing the mission in accordance with the commander's operational approach.

- **Step 3. Course of Action War Game**. COA War Game involves a detailed assessment of each friendly COA against anticipated reactions of the adversary and the independent will of the population. The war game assists planners in identifying strengths and weaknesses, associated risks, and asset shortfalls for each friendly COA. Course of action wargaming also identifies branches and potential sequels that may require additional planning.

- **Step 4. Course of Action Comparison and Decision**. During COA comparison and decision, the commander evaluates all friendly COAs against established criteria, then compares them against each other, then decides on a COA that best accomplish the mission or may need to be further developed and wargamed.

- **Step 5. Orders Development**. During orders development, the OPT along with the staff translates the commander's decision into oral, written, and graphic direction that direct unit actions and facilitates planning, execution, and initiative by subordinates.

- **Step 6. Transition**. A Transition may involve a wide range of briefs, drill, or rehearsals by those who will execute the order, to ensure a successful shift from planning to execution.




**Figure. 1-1**

# CHAPTER 2

# CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

*"Our command and control processes and systems must reflect our maneuver warfare philosophy. Decision making that focuses on speed and creating tempo, mission command that focuses on low level initiative, simple planning processes and orders writing techniques that are measured by the quality of the intent, all require a command and control system that is flexible, adaptable, and resilient."*

*—General David H. Berger, 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps*

## 2000. Overview

It is difficult to imagine any scenario where Marines will operate in an environment without the presence of a civilian population and where civil considerations will not affect military actions. The goal of CMO planning is to mitigate the negative effects of military actions on a civilian population and conversely, prevent the civilian population from interfering with military actions against an enemy or adversary. Military actions will require a careful balance between the application of force and the need to accommodate legal and ethical obligations to civilians in the OE. Therefore, the MAGTF commander and their staff must analyze how the civil landscape affects the mission. They need to develop specific approaches and goals directly related to conducting CMO.

## 2001. Department of Defense Policy

Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.05 (December 13, 2018) established DOD policy and assigns responsibilities for stabilization efforts. This directive provides guidance for

the planning, training, execution, and oversight of stabilization. DODD 3000.05 describes the immediate goals for stability operations to the extent authorized by law. DOD will plan and conduct stabilization in support of mission partners across the range of military operations in order to counter subversion; prevent and mitigate conflict; and consolidate military gains to achieve strategic success. DOD will emphasize a small-footprint, partner-focused stabilization that works by, with, and through indigenous populations and institutions other external partners to achieve strategic objectives. CMO functions are those activities performed by military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions (IPI) by directly supporting the achievement of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation (HN). Furthermore, CMO are conducted in order to facilitate unified action in joint operations, the ultimate purpose of which is to establish, restore, or maintain a stable OE.

Additionally, unified action is achieved when all partners are integrated into planning and all actions are coordinated and synchronized to achieve the commander's objectives. This applies particularly to partners and activities that are not within the command authority of, or do not have command relationships with, a joint force commander (JFC).

The Department of State is the overall lead federal agency for U.S. stabilization efforts; the , U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the lead implementing agency for non-security U.S. stabilization assistance; and DOD is a supporting element, including providing requisite security and reinforcing civilian efforts where appropriate and consistent with available statutory authorities. The stabilization assistance review (SAR) framework outlines steps by which State, USAID, and DOD will work more effectively together and efficiently manage resources to apply lessons learned from past stabilization efforts and ensure unity of effort.

## 2002. Civil-Military Operations Functions and Components

Commanders conduct CMO to attain unified action between the military and civilian counterparts during the execution of operations. Unified action synchronizes, coordinates, and integrates joint, Marine Corps, and multinational operations with the activities of other United States Government (USG) departments and agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),

international organizations (IO) (e.g., the United Nations (UN)), and the private sector to achieve unity of effort. Synchronizing, coordinating, and integrating all partner efforts with those of the MAGTF in a whole-of-government approach, is essential to obtaining a unified objective of stabilization.

- **CMO Functions**. CMO functions are those activities performed by Marines that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between the MAGTF and IPI by directly supporting the achievement of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation.

- **CMO Components**. The components of CMO are broad categorizations consisting of the supporting actions required to achieve CMO objectives. Each CMO component consists of CMO activities, which are capabilities that support the overall CMO goals and objectives through the execution of assigned missions and tasks. As depicted below, the three components of CMO include civil-military relations, enabling operations, and information management.

## 2003. Civil Affairs Supported Activities

CA supported activities are those functions in which CA plays a key planning, coordinating, or synchronizing role, but they are not the proponent or primary executor of. These supported activities include foreign assistance, foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), populace and resources control (PRC), and civil-military engagement (CME). These missions are executed through a combination of capabilities provided by elements of the MAGTF or joint force.

CA supports these operations through the planning, integration, execution, and transitioning of CAO. CA knowledge and expertise of the civil dimension of the battlespace provides commanders with the necessary tools to execute military operations with minimal impact by or on the civilian populace. In the current and predicted future operating environment, the MAGTF will conduct these missions that are population centric and require CA capabilities.

CA can enable the integration of populations and resources in support of the mission and commander's end state. They help to harmonize of unified action partners, IPI, and interagency within the mission requirements in addition to providing expertise concerning the authorities that oversee the conduct of these operations. Foreign assistance, FHA, PRC, and CME are all heavily regulated depending on the type or subset of the mission being conducted. CA forces are trained on authorities that pertain to these missions and can provide critical information to the commander and staff for their successful execution.

## 2004. Civil Information Management

Civil information management is an essential activity for all CA Marines in coordination with unit command staffs (i.e., S-2, S-3 or higher) and should be broadly organized to the supported unit's intelligence and maneuver elements to enhance the common tactical/operational picture (CTP/COP) and facilitate the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE), Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB), Civil Preparation of the Battlespace (CPB), and/or other information gathering processes. CMO planners provide the commander with expertise on data collection and information management related to the civil component of the operational environment. The CIM process is continuous, occurs across the competition continuum, and develops timely and accurate civil component information critical to the commander's understanding, planning, and decision-making.

CIM is a CA process whereby civil information is gathered, analyzed, and entered into a centralized database. It is fused with the supported MAGTF and joint intelligence organizations, other USG departments and agencies, interagency partners, IOs, NGOs, and the private sector to ensure the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of both raw and analyzed civil information to the unified action partners.

Civil considerations are developed from data with relation to areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) within the commander's operational environment. The management of civil information is the fusion of analyzed data into the common operating picture (COP) to benefit the supported commander, DOD, interagency, IO, NGO, and IPIs.

CIM enhances situational awareness and facilitates understanding for all elements in the operational environment, allowing those elements to achieve decision superiority. While every CA Marine has the ability to conduct basic analysis of civil information, trained CMO planners' and chiefs' analyses of that civil information provides an enhanced situational understanding.

## 2005. Civil Preparation of the Battlespace

Civil preparation of the battlespace (CPB) is used to examine civil considerations in support of Problem Framing and supplement the overall intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) process. IPB is the systematic analysis relating to enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations. The IPB process allows commanders and staffs to take a holistic approach to analyzing the operational environment. This holistic approach:

- Describes the totality of relevant aspects of the operational environment that may impact friendly, adversary, and neutral forces
- Accounts for all relevant domains that may impact friendly and adversary operations
- Allows commanders to leverage aspects of the operational environment at a time and place most advantageous for mission success with the most accurate information available
- Identifies windows of opportunity to leverage friendly capabilities against adversary forces

IPB results in the creation of intelligence products that are used during MCPP to aid in developing friendly courses of action and decision points for the commander. IPB is most effective and best aids the commander's decision making when the intelligence staff integrates the expertise of the other staff sections and supporting elements, for instance civil affairs and military information support personnel, into its analysis. This is especially true when operating in environments where the effects of the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations are complex, multidimensional, and not easily determined. CMO planners provide civil

considerations through the CPB process, which coincides with the IPB process, but they can be completed independently.

CPB is conducted through the framework of METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available - time available,civil considerations) in order to focus on civil considerations as they relate to the overall operational environment and mission accomplishment. CPB analyzes the various aspects of civil information and assesses the civil impact of friendly, adversary, and external actors, as well as the local populace, on MAGTF operations and objectives.

CPB is a four-step iterative process that is designed to support MAGTF decision makers, staff, and the total force by filtering, recording, evaluating, analyzing, and producing civil information and staff products. It is conducted to apply aspects of the civil environment within the MCPP while complementing IPB. The four steps of the CPB process are:

- Define the civil operating environment
- Analyze the civil operating environment
- Develop a civil environment model
- Determine civil actions

Each step in the process is refined continually to ensure that the CPB products are accurate and relevant in decision making. CMO planners and CA Marines on staff are typically responsible for developing, refining, and continually updating the CPB through-out the planning process and during the conduct of CMO operations.

## 2006. Civil-Military Operations Planning

CMO Planners and CA staff provide a dedicated planning capability and are nested within the tables of organization of the MAGTF. The G-9/S-9 (when forward deployed), as a primary staff officer, is responsible for the planning, integration, and assessment of civil considerations into MCPP. The key to successful G-9/S-9 staff support is ensuring the civil component within the operating environment is factored into current and future planning and is subsequently captured in branches and sequels based on the anticipated or realized outcomes of current operations. The G-9/S-9 is designated to provide the commander with actionable civil information that will

increase the commander's awareness and understanding of the civil component, ensure efficient use of finite resources, and harmonize the efforts of unified action partners, IPI, and interagency within the operational environment.

CMO Planners can be requested to supplement Marine staffs to facilitate and manage CAO in support of the commander's CMO concept. In a MAGTF without an assigned G/S-9 or a battalion level where there is not a dedicated G-9 position, the CA detachment commander or team leader might be required to perform the duties of the CA staff officer. It is critical that CA officers and noncommissioned officers understand the MCPP and can incorporate civil data and information into planning processes.

Effective CMO planning requires an in-depth understanding of the operational environment at all levels. Moreover, it requires creativity and the ability to visualize changes in the operational environment. CMO Planners must be able to visualize the use of military and non-military forces and capabilities to achieve the Commander's desired endstate. A well-developed plan does not guarantee successful implement, which makes flexibility and adaptability essential to planning. An effective planning process structures the thinking of commanders and staffs while supporting their insight, creativity, and initiative. It also allows for collaborative planning, the following provides an overview of the most common stakeholders CMO planners interact with during planning:

- G-9. Normally having staff cognizance over CMO/CAO, the G-9 should also review and approve information and products the CMO planner, CMO working group, and green cell will provide as inputs to the planning process. The G-9 is typically the senior CMO/CA professional in the command and may serve as an OPT member and CMO working group lead. In the event there is no G-9 assigned, the Marine Expeditionary Forces have CMO planner billets within their tables of organization who can assume the staff cognizance role.
- CMO Working Group. A standing working group with input from a variety of staff sections and SMEs, who together with the green cell, are "owners" of the CPB process and inform the OPT/G-9 on civil considerations during planning. The CMO planner is an integral member and may even lead the group, as necessary.

- The Green Cell. An ad hoc working group that assists the commander and the OPT in understanding the effects of the civil environment on both friendly and adversary forces. The green cell consists of individuals with a diversity of backgrounds, education, and experiences capable of identifying and considering the perspective of the population, civil authorities, and other civilian stakeholders. Like the red cell, the green cell is used throughout the entire planning process, but with a focus on testing the effect of the civil environment on friendly and adversary courses of action. (See also MCCMOS Circular 3.1, Green Cell).

## 2007. Joint Planning Process

Planners should also incorporate CMO into the Joint Planning Process (JPP). CMO Planners must ensure their input supports the joint forces commander's (JFC) intent and operational concept. The J-9 (CMO directorate of a joint staff) normally leads the CMO staff element and is an important asset in planning and coordinating CMO. Planning should establish the objectives, measures of effectiveness (MOE), decisive points, and desired outcomes of the operation or campaign. CMO planning normally conforms to six lines of effort (LOE): governance, economic stability, infrastructure, public health and welfare, public education and information, and rule of law.

Normally, a joint task force will have a J-9, to serve as the JFC's lead for planning CMO. While not all of the geographic combatant commands have this staff section organic to their joint manning document, Marine CA can provide planning teams to assist the JFC with deliberate and crisis action planning.

During the JPP, just as in MCPP, CMO planners and CA Marines provide the commander with an analysis of the civil components that shape the operational environment. Civil considerations are analyzed and evaluated for the aspects of the operational environment that directly affect mission accomplishment. CMO planners further develop and implement their plans in conjunction with civilian officials from other USG agencies and nonmilitary organizations in order to synchronize and harmonize US and multinational efforts. The J-9 responsibilities include, but are not limited to:

- Advising the JFC and staff on legal and ethical responsibilities as they pertain to the civil component.
- Recommending CA force requirements.
- Participating in the targeting process to identify civil component protected targets.
- Analyzing the effects of civilian populations on military operations.
- Identifying nongovernmental and other independent organizations operating in the AO.
- Participating in boards, cells, and workgroups to ensure CMO is synchronized and harmonized as required.

## 2008. Rapid Response Planning Process

Used primarily by Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), Rapid Response Planning Process (R2P2) is a time-leveraged planning process that enables a MEU to begin execution of an assigned task within six hours. To do so, MEUs conduct the deliberate planning - within the context of the intended area of responsibility - as well as the rehearsal of potential missions, such as foreign humanitarian assistance FHA or noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), during pre-deployment training. Accordingly, R2P2, when coupled with the extensive use of SOPs, enables a MEU to focus its execution planning on those aspects of a problem unique to the current situation. It is only necessary that some element of the execution begin within the six-hour time frame, which element that is depends upon the situation as shown in Figure 2-1.




**Figure. 2-1**

The R2P2 is the same as the MCPP with some modifications due to time constraints. As with any planning process information flow is essential. If you know something, tell some else who needs to know it. Try to provide knowledge rather than simple information. Making informed decisions requires knowledge and understanding. Being aware of the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) mitigates information overload and helps the staff to concentrate on the essentials. The staff should establish a single point of contact to control the information flow. To facilitate effective information flow, the staff should standardize as much as possible the types of graphics used in briefs and focus on reducing briefing redundancies.

# CHAPTER 3

## CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS SUPPORT TO PROBLEM FRAMING

*"We promised the Iraqi people freedom, democracy, security and a new and far better life… Yet, here we are, long and difficult years into that conflict… we still have not created the state we promised them. On the contrary, our costly and valiant efforts have produced an outcome our government did not predict or intend - a failed state spinning out of control into anarchy and civil war.*

*- Gen. Anthony Zinni (Ret.)*

## 3000. Introduction

The first step of MCPP is Problem Framing, a commander-driven design methodology supported by staff actions. This step is essential to the entire planning process and provides planners an opportunity to gain an enhanced understanding of the operational environment (OE) and the nature of the problem. This greater understanding leads to the purpose of the operation

(identifying “what” must be accomplished and most importantly why). Problem Framing is viewed as the most important step of MCPP and affects the entire decision-making process. If the problem is insufficiently understood, planning conducted in subsequent steps is unlikely to address the root cause(s) of the problem.

## 3001. Civil-Military Operations Planning Considerations

CMO planners must analyze the operational environment and the nature of the problem from the civil perspective. Civil preparation of the battlespace (CPB) is key to the overall assessment of the OE and the impact of adversary, friendly, and other actors on the mission. CMO planners must identify relative CMO assets and capabilities, where those assets are located, and then be able to integrate those assets into the planning and execution of the concept of support. CMO planners also begin to develop the CMO staff estimate. The staff estimate provides a timely examination of factors and is the primary means of informing the commander. Once the commander approves a COA, the CA staff estimate supports the development of the Annex G (CMO).

## 3002. Injects, Activities, and Results Diagram for Problem Framing

Figure 3-1. depicts the injects, activities, and results for the problem framing step. The diagram is not intended to be used as a checklist, but as a ready reference to help promote understanding for the entire process. The information shown in bold highlights the commander’s personal involvement during each part of this step.




**Figure 3-1. Injects, Activities, and Results Diagram for Problem Framing**

## 3003. Problem Framing Injects

**a. Commander's Orientation.** The typical injects to Problem Framing are the commander's orientation, higher headquarters (HHQ) warning order, operations order, and intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB). The CMO planner should provide the operational context from a civil perspective to deepen the commander's understanding of the problem and contribute to design. The commander's orientation demonstrates their personal involvement in the planning process and allows them to set the tone for subsequent planning.

**b. Higher Headquarters.** The typical injects to Problem Framing are the commander's orientation, higher headquarters (HHQ) warning order, operations order, and intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB). The CMO planner should provide the operational context from a civil perspective to deepen the commander's understanding of the problem and contribute to design. The commander's orientation demonstrates their personal involvement in the planning process and allows them to set the tone for subsequent planning.

**c. Civil Preparation of the Battlespace.** CPB enables the commander to gain an understanding of the civil dimension of the broader operational environment. The nature of the civil products required to support the commander's systemic examination of the OE emphasizes the importance

of this activity. Understanding the OE provides background information, facts status, connections, and other relevant civil factors that serve as context for the commander and staff to better understand the problem.

## 3004. Problem Framing Activities

**a. Design.** The goal of design is to achieve a deeper understanding gained largely through critical thinking and dialogue. Design leads to an actionable operational approach that provides guidance for detailed planning and execution. A design methodology is central to the problem framing effort. Design occurs throughout the planning-execution-assessment continuum.

The Marine Corps Design Methodology (MSTP Pamphlet 5-0.1), helps planners determine the correct set of problems, and a framework for solving them. The design methodology consists of four distinct actions:

- Describe the Current and Desired States of the Operating Environment
- Define the Problem Set
- Produce the Operational Approach
- Reframe throughout Planning and Execution.

The commander's operational approach provides context for the examination of what the command must accomplish, when and where it must be done, and most importantly, why—the purpose of the operation.

**b. Understanding Yourself.** What does understand yourself mean? It begins with an internal review of your organization. As the CMO planner should be asking, how many Marines are in the unit? What are their military occupational specialties, Marine Corps experience, CMO experience and so forth? What CA capacity do you really have? Then look across the unit you are supporting. What organic assets might be available to support your CMO efforts? Now look up one level. What does the Detachment have that may be an asset to you? Is there a judge advocate or a medical officer at the Detachment HQ? Continue expanding your view, look at capabilities and the capacity of other military units and interorganizational agencies in the area.

**c. Understanding the Environment.** Analyzing the environment helps identify and describe current conditions – this will aid in developing the problem statement. CMO Planners and staffs must observe their operating environment and then orient to the best possible advantage to carry out feasible actions. The essential activities in understanding the environment include critical thinking and dialogue. CMO planners must consider, but are not limited to the following:

- HHQ design, mission, intent, orders, directives, and guidance
- Intel products to include IPB
- Area studies / assessments
- CPB analysis
- Key influences / relationships
- Population / culture / language
- Geography / demographics / climate

**d. Civil Considerations.** CMO planners advise the commander and staff on key aspects of the civil dimension to be considered as the OPT progresses in the planning process. These civil considerations may be physical, cultural, or relational. Civil considerations focus on the relevant impact of the civil population on operations, providing the following:

- Civil dimension planning factors
- Civil capabilities
- Cultural behavior
- Weather implications
- Civil most likely / most disruptive actions

**e. Understanding the Problem.** The first step in trying to understand the problem is gathering the facts and information related to the problem. For CMO planners and staffs, time is a limiting factor, often requiring them to draw information from those resources readily available to begin piecing/connecting the information. To help with piecing together relevant information as timely as possible personal observations, experiences, discussions with others on the staff can be useful. However, leveraging the commander's understanding of the problem will add clarity and focus

for the staff and OPT to build a complete picture of the problem.

CMO planners, however, should understand and define the problem from the civil perspective. This understanding will allow the CMO planner and the CMO working group to inform the CE OPT's process to ensure the problem incorporates relevant civil concerns or characteristics. It is imperative that the CMO planner, with the support of the CMO working group, understands the process and timelines of the OPT to provide timely input to decision making. For example, the OPT may consider synthesizing their understanding of the nature of the problem and produce a problem statement. Similarly, the CMO planner synthesizes their understanding of the nature of the problem into a problem statement from the civil perspective and provides input to the OPT. While there is no set format for a problem statement, a methodology may be to start with, "How to…" and may include:

- Who: the opposing sides – the relationship between competitors or forces.
- What: the defeat/stability mechanism – the conditions to establish and prevent.
- When: the time component – the relationship between opponents in time.
- Where: the center of gravity or decisive point that gives the commander stating the problem a competitive advantage.

**Example**: How to support the Republic of the Gambia's relief effort while minimizing U.S. military presence in the City of Brikama.

**f. Commander's Initial Intent and Planning Guidance.** Commander's Intent is the commander's personal expression of the purpose of the operation. The purpose of the unit's operation is derived from understanding the problem to be solved. It must align with HHQ's purpose and be clear, concise, and easily understood. It also, answers the "why, how, and to what extent" questions for the operation [purpose, method (if known) and end state]. It may include how the commander envisions achieving a decision as well as the end state conditions that, when satisfied, accomplish the purpose. Commander's intent helps subordinates understand the larger context of their actions and guides them in the absence of orders. The commander will continue to review and refine the intent, as necessary. Based on a variety of considerations, such as available time, the commander's initial planning guidance may be narrow and directive or it

may be broad and inquisitive. Regardless, the staff will follow, and may recommend, further planning guidance to support the staff's actions.

**g. Staff Actions.** The planning process provides venues for interactions between the commander, OPT, staff, and subordinate units. When the staff or OPT briefs the commander, they are providing, in part, the results of their actions. When the commander provides guidance, their direction represents a synthesis of the staff's input, along with other sources of information, which manifest in the form of a decision on how to proceed. Once CMO planners have a better understanding of the operational environment and have additional guidance from the OPT, they will conduct a detailed analysis of tasks, assumptions, limitations, shortfalls, and information requirements. All of the following actions enhance understanding and increase planning effectiveness largely through their contribution to the design methodology.

**h. Task Analysis.** With an understanding of the OE, friendly capabilities, the nature of the problem, the purpose of the operation, and a description of the desired end state or mission success, CMO planners analyze tasks from the civil-military perspective. The learning and understanding that occur through task analysis help to enhance the understanding of the problem and contribute to the design effort. Commands rarely receive a mission, generally, they receive tasks that planners analyze as a basis for determining the unit's mission. The principal source for tasks is the higher headquarters plan or operations order. However, planners may derive tasks from other sources. Using the commander's initial guidance and higher headquarters' orders and annexes, CMO planners identify specified and determine implied CMO tasks.

- **Specified Tasks**. Planners primarily draw specified tasks directly from the execution paragraphs of the higher headquarters operation order. However, specified tasks may be found elsewhere, such as in the mission statement, coordinating instructions, or annexes and appendices. Planners should identify and record any specified tasks relevant to CMO and CA Marines. The following guidelines will assist CMO planners in forming precise specified tasks: (a) Identify all specified tasks relevant to CMO and CA Marines; (b) Record the reference, page, and paragraph number where the task was located; (c) omit SOP or routine tasks such as "submit daily SITREPS;" (d) keep track of all tasks (use a

spreadsheet). (e) example: Coordinate with civil authorities in the area of operations in order to harmonize MAGTF actions with those of local agencies and achieve unity of effort.

- **Implied Tasks**. Implied tasks are not specifically stated in the higher headquarters order but are tasks necessary to accomplish specified tasks. Implied tasks emerge from analysis of the HHQ order, the threat (as applicable), and our understanding of the problem. Routine, inherent, enduring, or SOP activities are not implied tasks: (a) Implied tasks should be linked to a specified task; (b) implied tasks should be reviewed to determine necessity, non-routine task; (c) CMO planners must review and analyze all specified tasks to identify and draft any CMO implied tasks (see Annex E) ; (d) example: specified – Support host nation disaster relief efforts within the MAGTF AO; implied – Coordinate with civil authorities, IPIs, and international organizations for the unified delivery of sourced relief supplies within the MAGTF AO.
- **Essential Tasks**. Essential tasks are specified or implied tasks that define mission success and apply to the force as a whole. If a task must be successfully completed for the commander to accomplish the purpose of the mission, it is an essential task. The OPT develops the mission statement from the essential tasks. CMO planners should recommend essential tasks, if applicable, for inclusion into the mission statement. CMO planners - do not develop a separate CMO mission statement.

**i. Centers of Gravity Analysis.** The staff conducts a centers of gravity (COG) analysis based on understanding gained through design and task analysis. Centers of gravity analysis is used to identify and refine adversary and friendly COGs and to determine which friendly and adversary weaknesses may in fact be critical vulnerabilities. Critical vulnerabilities provide aiming points for the application of friendly strengths against adversary weaknesses. Similarly, planners identify friendly critical vulnerabilities to protect against the application of adversary strengths against friendly weaknesses.

**j. Develop Assumptions.** Assumptions are suppositions about the current situation or future events. They are assumed to be true for planning purposes, in the absence of other facts that

would prove the assumption otherwise. Assumptions are used to continue planning and allow the commander to decide on a course of action. They apply to friendly, adversary, and civil considerations. Assumptions trigger additional staff actions. CMO Planners should determine, record, and validate all assumptions from the civil perspective prior to execution or build into the plan, a method to observe the assumption and have a course of action planned when the assumption is validated. If an assumption is tied to mission success, the CMO planner needs to recommend a CCIR be added to the information management (IM) plan to monitor this void in information. A valid assumption should answer all of the following:

- Is it logical?
- Is it realistic?
- Is it essential for planning to continue?
- Does it avoid assuming away a friendly or adversary capability or task relevant to CMO?

**Example**: There will be a significantly reduced international and nongovernmental organizations presence and capacity to support host nation disaster relief efforts.

**k. Determine Limitations.** Planning limitations are actions required or prohibited by higher authority that limits the commander's freedom of action or movement (e.g., legal basis and scope, status of forces agreements, enable civil authorities). Normally, stated as restraints (what cannot be done) and constraints (what must be done) that do not qualify as specified tasks, but require identification. Planners must address the identified limitations during COA development and subsequent planning, as they affect the conduct of operations.

**l. Develop the Mission Statement.** The most important decision coming out of Problem Framing is the mission statement. The mission statement is a solution-based expression of the problem set. The purpose of the operation and the essential tasks, as identified in task analysis, are the foundation for the mission. The commander approves the proposed mission statement, modifies it, or develops a new mission statement as a prelude to COA development. The approved mission statement (there is only one, staff sections do not have their own) becomes the foundation of an OPLAN or OPORD. A properly constructed mission statement answers the

following questions:

- Who (the forces that will conduct the operation)?
- What (the essential tasks and, as necessary, type of operations)?
- When (the time or event that determines when an operation will start or end)?
- Where (the location of the AO)?
- Why (the purpose and intent of the operation)?

**Example of a mission statement**: "On order, Regimental Landing Team, in partnership with governmental and host nation security forces clears enemy forces in zone, and coordinates with civil authorities to support expansion of stability, development and legitimate governance." Be sure to define tactical terms used in describing tasks to provide understanding and intent. For proper task terminology, refer to MCDP 1-0 Appendix C.

**m. Identify CMO Shortfalls.** During the initial task analysis, CMO planners should identify personnel, equipment, and resource gaps as early as possible and throughout planning based on the mission and available resources. CMO planners will need to identify specific CMO resources needed to accomplish the essential tasks to determine additional support requirements. These resources include but are not limited to, CA Marines, communication requirements (tactical or commercial computer assets and phones), and information exchange requirements (command and control systems and applications) such as MARCIMS and Share Point. CMO shortfalls may also include civilian and local SMEs.

**Example**: If the MAGTF is tasked to support agricultural development; there is no agricultural subject expert organic to the MAGTF or U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) liaison officer attached to the MAGTF.

**n. Propose Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs).** CCIRs are critical pieces of information the commander needs to decide. CCIRs help the staff prioritize information requirements and resource allocation. Only the commander decides what information is critical, but the CMO planner/working group should propose CCIRs to the

commander. Subcategories of CCIRs are friendly force information requirements (FFIRs) and priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). FFIRs are information requirements that are related to the disposition of friendly forces. PIRs are information requirements related to the adversary and the environment. The staff must consider data collection and resources required. Too many CCIRs may create a requirement for additional assets to collect against them, then the unit is willing to allocate.

**Example**: Are there impacts to local infrastructure that will negatively affect the conduct of MAGTF operations in the AO?

**o. Convene the Green Cell.** The Green Cell is formed to assist the commander and planning group in assessing the friendly force's planning from the civil perspective. The Green Cell plays a prominent role during the COA development and COA wargame steps, but the cell forms and begins its work during this step. Depending on the size of the organization, a Green Cell can range in size from an officer with CMO experience to a task-organized group of SMEs including international organizations, NGOs, interagency representatives, political advisors, regional area officers, CA SMEs, or PA and IO representatives. The Green Cell typically falls under the staff cognizance of the G-9/3 or senior CA officer.

**p. Identify CMO Requests for Information (RFIs).** CMO planners identify information necessary to remove assumptions, support future plans or conduct current operations. Based on the CPB and information requirements including CCIRs, the commander and staff identify gaps in information and intelligence. CMO planners forward requests for information (RFIs) in accordance with the information management (IM) plan established by the IM officer (IMO). Over time, the number of RFIs can make tracking them a challenging effort. It is important to identify a management tool and an individual tasked to track RFI submissions and response to support this effort.

**q. Initial CMO Staff Estimate.** The CMO staff estimate provides key information (facts, assumptions, asset locations and availability, forecasted shortages, etc.) and depicts how each

COA will be supported from a CMO perspective. This estimate provides a timely examination of factors that support decision making and can affect mission accomplishment. CMO planners will update their staff estimate throughout the planning process. Ultimately, the CMO staff estimate provides the basis for the CMO Annex. An example of a staff estimate can be found in Annex A or the MCWP 5-10, Appendix G.

**r. Operation Assessment.** Assessment is an inherent staff action that each member of a command performs in their respective functional areas. If a command determines the need to organize an assessment cell, the commander will either need external augmentation or source within, since there are no assessment cells in any standing MAGTFs. Ideally, an assessment cell will form with the onset of planning. The essential goal of an assessment cell is to explain the command's progress toward a desired state. In design terms, an assessment cell will update its environmental frame via measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs). To explain why the unit is progressing or not, the assessment cell must interact with sufficient battle rhythm events to inform a rational narrative that could include recommendations for change, see MCRP 5-10.1.

## 3005. Problem Framing Results

**a. Problem Framing Brief.** The OPT presents a Problem Framing brief to the commander to review the completed products and ensure a shared understanding across the staff. When approved by the commander, these products inform COA Development. The CMO planner / working group should be prepared to brief the G-9 (or senior CA Marine) on their input to the Problem Framing brief answer any questions regarding the material, and to improve the G-9's understanding of the civil environment prior to briefing the OPT and commander.

**b. Commander's Approval and Guidance.** After the Problem framing brief and review of the completed products, the commander should approve the mission statement and provide an operational approach (intent and guidance) to inform COA Development. This guidance should be a clear and concise expression of what the command intends to accomplish and how available

resources will be allocated. Commander's COA Development guidance may be presented in terms of warfighting functions, lines of operation, and/or forms of maneuver. Most importantly, this guidance should include the Commander's vision of the decisive action. This visualization assists the staff in determining the battlespace framework to include the main effort.

**c. Warning Order.** With the above list of specific decisions, approvals, and guidance requested of the commander, the OPT should draft and deliver a warning order to allow subordinate units to begin concurrent planning. CMO planners should provide input to the warning order and this information should facilitate concurrent planning. CMO planners may provide, but are not limited to, information on the civil environment, CMO assumptions, and CMO focused CCIRs.

# CHAPTER 4

## CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS SUPPORT TO COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

*"Like war itself, our approach to warfighting must evolve. If we cease to refine, expand, and improve our profession, we risk becoming outdated, stagnant, and defeated."*

*- General Alfred Gray, 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps*

## 4000. Introduction

Course of Action (COA) Development leads to one or more options to accomplish the mission. During COA development, planners use the products carried forward from problem framing to generate options to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander's operational approach. The OPT must use its collective experience and judgement to creatively develop potential solutions to an approved mission. For options to be distinguishable, each COA must employ different means or methods that address the essential tasks and incorporate the commander's operational approach. Developed COAs should be "FAS-DC":

- **Feasible**: Does the COA accomplish the mission within the available time, space, and resources?
- **Acceptable**: Does the COA achieve an advantage that justifies the cost in resources?
- **Suitable**: Does the COA accomplish the purpose and tasks? Does it comply with the commander's operational approach?
- **Distinguishable**: Does the COA differ from other COAs?
- **Complete**: Does the COA address all tasks? Does it address the entire command?

When developing COAs, planners must consider two fundamental questions:

- What needs to be accomplished?
- How should it be done? (the answer is the essence of COA development)

## 4001. Civil-Military Operations Planning Considerations

During COA Development, CMO planners are responsible for considering the possible impact the force will have on the civil environment and the civil component's impact on the conduct of operations. The CMO planner must be prepared to address the OPT regarding the effects friendly actions may have on the civil environment, as well as provide suitable enhancement or mitigation measures for each COA. CMO planners may use the civil environment model, from the CPB process to enhance the OPT's awareness of the civil environment. The civil environment model may include but is not limited to, the following: key influences, sources of instability and stability, and a civil modified combine obstacle overlay (MCOO).

Normally, the CMO planner will be considered the SME on CA capabilities and integration vital to all operation types across the competition continuum. Therefore, CMO planners must be equipped to plan civil affairs operations (CAO) and leverage recognized expertise in support of MAGTF operations. The CMO support for each COA must contain sufficient detail to facilitate wargaming. Planners may return to COA Development during wargaming if their COAs are incomplete and require additional detail to continue the war game.

## 4002. Injects, Activities, and Results Diagram for Course of Action Development

Figure 4-1., depicts the injects, activities, and results for the COA Development step. The results of each step provide the injects for the following step. The process as a whole is as much iterative as it is sequential. The information shown in bold highlights the commander's personal involvement during each part of this step.




**Figure 4-1. Injects, Activities, and Results Diagram for Course Of Action Development**

## 4003. Course of Action Development Injects

It is important to begin this step with any updates to the adversary and civil environment to ensure that the OPT has a common understanding of the operational environment. Also, essential to COA development is the Mission Statement, Commander's Operational Approach (commander's intent and COA development guidance) normally disseminated to the force via a Warning Order. The following staff actions assist COA development:

**a. Update Products.** Planners view the battlespace in terms of the adversary and the environment. This helps planners determine how the adversary and civilian population will react to proposed friendly COAs, the purpose of adversary actions, the most likely and most dangerous adversary COAs, the most likely and most disruptive civil actions, and the type of friendly actions that the terrain, weather, and infrastructure will allow. Thus, it is critical that staff planners continue to update and refine both the IPB and CPB to deepen their understanding of the situation and to answer the two fundamental questions posed in COA Development.

**b. Refine CCIRs.** With approved CCIRs, planners begin to link individual PIRs and FFIRs to specific decisions. CCIRs are updated and refined throughout planning to help prepare the commander for possible key decisions required during execution and to prepare the staff and

units for timely execution of or changes to the plan. CMO planners will review any recommended CCIRs to reflect any change to key information requirements tied to decision points or needed for the conduct of CMO/CAO.

**c. Red Cell.** During COA Development, the red cell builds and refines adversary COAs, using the adversary COAs in IPB as its starting point. As planning continues, the red cell provides updates and findings for IPB refinement. The red cell researches the tendencies and biographies and histories of opposing force commanders and units and refines its plan accordingly. The Red Cell also articulates the adversary commander's anticipated knowledge of friendly intentions and plans. The red cell must have adversary COAs completed in sufficient detail for wargaming by the end of COA Development.

**d. Green Cell.** During COA Development, the green cell aids in building and refining friendly COAs and supports the CMO planner in updating the CPB products for the OPT and COA brief. The green cell may also provide considerations for non-DOD entities, such as international organizations or nongovernmental organizations. The most challenging aspect of the process is taking what is known and estimating what, when, and how it will actually occur in the civil operating environment. The green cell should identify the initiatives, events, and important dates for organizations and/or the population that may affect friendly or adversary operations. The green cell should not work in isolation as it provides critical insights into the reaction of civilian groups to both friendly and adversary actions.

**e. Update CMO Staff Estimate.** The CMO staff estimate supports the COA development process by providing essential civil information, such as a CMO problem statement, assumptions, limitations, resources, key nodes, physical infrastructure, and proposed CCIRs. The staff estimate assists CMO planners during COA development by providing essential information on civil environment, identifying requirements and capabilities, determining shortfalls, and identifying potential solutions to those shortfalls. CMO planners should ensure the CMO staff estimate is updated and refined to deepen the OPT's understanding of the impact of the civil environment on the mission throughout the planning process.

**f. Operation Assessment Planning.** Planners, in conjunction with an assessment cell if formed, will further develop the operational assessment framework in accordance with the refined commander's operational approach.

## 4004. Course of Action Development Activities

Guided primarily by the commander's COA development guidance, along with the planning products created in Problem Framing, planners begin developing options to accomplish the mission. The number of COAs and level of detail depend on the commander's guidance and the time available for planning. CMO planners may develop one CMO concept of support that is capable of supporting all developed MAGTF COAs or several concepts of support for each COA. There are numerous techniques for developing COAs, regardless of the technique used, planners should consider the following factors:

**a. Battlespace Framework.** This framework describes how the commander will organize his battlespace and forces to accomplish the mission. During this stage, CMO planners will begin to identify the MAGTF's CMO responsibilities as well as command relationships. The commander can organize his battlespace in a variety of ways, such as spatial, purpose, or lines of operation (LOO). Friendly forces are usually tasked in accordance with their capabilities and assigned in terms of its effort: main, supporting, reserve, or security.

- **Spatial Framework.** In a conventional operating environment, the battlespace is often described in spatial terms: deep, close, and rear. CAO may be used to support units operating in any of these areas.
- **Purpose Framework.** Activities in the battlespace can be described in terms of purpose: shaping actions - help set conditions for decisive actions, decisive actions - event or activities critical to mission success and sustaining actions - shaping actions directed at friendly forces.
- **Line of Operation (LOO) Framework.** Lines of operations is a framework used most often in support of operations in permissive environments (e.g., FHA or HADR). This methodology focuses the force's effort on broad mission related objectives designed to

achieve specific effects on the adversary and/or the operating environment. Achieving these effects should lead to objective and mission accomplishment.

**Example**: A CA Team may be attached to a maneuver force that has been designated the main effort in a HADR operation or counterinsurgency environment.

**b. Array of Forces.** Friendly, adversary, and when relevant populations should be arrayed in the same venue while developing COAs. The OPT should array MAGTF, adversary, available friendly forces, and interagency/ interorganizational capabilities (units, personnel, materiel) against "generic" capability and resource requirements to accomplish the mission. CMO Planners should provide alternatives to eliminate or mitigate identified shortfalls for each COA. Shortfalls that carry over into execution create a degree of "risk."

**c. Assign Purpose and then Tasks.** Once forces have been identified, assign the purpose for each subordinate element, and identify the tactical tasks that best accomplish its purpose. Begin with the main effort, each supporting effort, and then the reserve. CMO planners must establish priorities and objectives for CMO and then determine the tasks necessary to accomplish the established CMO objectives in support of the MAGTF's mission requirements. CMO planners should also engage and influence unified action partners and IPI and provide CMO expertise through planning and execution to deconflict operations between the populace and military.

**d. Convert Generic Units to Specific Units.** During this step, units are converted from generic units to specific units to clarify the task organization. After determination of the requirements, CMO planners must recommend specific elements or related capabilities necessary to accomplish CMO objectives and tasks.

**e. Task Organization.** The OPT will account for all units (organic, attached, supporting, command element) and ensure each unit is constructed, sized, and resourced for success. Task organization includes a designation of a task organization commander, clarifies command relationships, and accounts for span of control. CMO planners will determine the necessary CA assets required to support the MAGTF's mission requirements and task organization.

**f. Synchronize.** Once the OPT has developed a COA, it should determine how to best synchronize the actions of all elements of the force (fires, maneuver, CMO, etc.). Use realistic movement rates and base them on actual capabilities relevant to the effects of terrain and weather. CMO planners should ensure that CMO tasks are properly organized in time, space, and purpose to support each COA. This synchronization of MAGTF tasks provides the initial sequence of actions that make up a "rough cut" COA. The planning support tools generally used to help synchronize each COA are the Synchronization Matrix and the COA Graphic and Narrative. CMO planners must ensure that CMO tasks are accurately recorded in both products.

**g. Develop Control Measures.** The OPT will determine control measures (boundaries, fire support measures, etc.) best suited to command and control the single battle. Control measures are assigned to expedite actions and ensure forces have sufficient battlespace and flexibility to accomplish their assigned tasks while protecting their forces. CMO planners should consider elements of the civil environment that may impact force actions (e.g., key infrastructure, political boundaries, refugee/displaced persons areas) and determine CMO focused control measures to be integrated into the MAGTF's overall plan.

**h. Rough-Cut COA Brief.** After the OPT has completed the initial COAs, the commander is briefed on each initial COA drafted. Normally, this informal review is often referred to as the "rough cut" COA brief. This is done in consideration of time to ensure that the options (COAs) being developed meet the commander's operational approach and allows the commander to make necessary adjustments. While the planners and staff have been working on the COAs/supporting concepts, the commander has continued to refine the operational approach. This is usually accomplished through the commander's dialogue with higher headquarters, as well as members of the staff and subordinate commanders. The "rough cut" COA brief also helps the commander further review design and the problem. The commander may eliminate COAs, direct modifications to drafted COAs, or direct the development of additional COAs.

**i. COA Graphic and Narrative.** Given additional guidance and direction from the commander, the OPT will further develop and refine the COAs to be approved for wargaming. The OPT will develop a COA graphic (a map chip) and narrative (description of the key points of the COA) to support briefing the organization of forces and to describe the 5-Ws during the

operation. The narrative usually describes (e.g., task/method/end state) how the MAGTF will accomplish the mission. Together, the graphic and narrative helps the commander, the staff, and subordinates understand MAGTF assets (main effort, supporting efforts, sustaining, and reserve) actions and locations, as well as the timing and sequencing of the operation.

**j. Refine Task Organization.** After the COAs are refined, the planners review the task organization. If necessary, the task organization is updated to ensure the force is constructed, sized, and resourced for success to be taken forward into COA War Game.

**k. Command Relationships.** Command relationships must be established and understood prior to execution to avoid operational friction. Using the updated task organization, planners ensure command relationships between organizations are logical to optimize command and control of the entire force. CMO planners must understand the various doctrinal command relationships, such as tactical control (TACON) - authority to give detailed direction and control of the movements or maneuver of attached or assigned forces and operational control (OPCON) - Authority to organize commands and forces and employ those forces as the commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. CMO planners should also know the doctrinal support relationships, such as direct support - a mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force's request for assistance and, general support - that support which is given to the supported force.

**l. Synchronization Matrix.** Figure 4-2., synchronization matrix is a decision support tool, a working document displaying activities and tasks of the command and subordinate elements for each COA. A synchronization matrix helps planners and units relate forces to one another in time, space, and purpose. It is the most important planning product coming out of COA Development and provides the necessary detail required to support wargaming. During Orders Development, the completed synchronization matrix enables planners to efficiently assign tasks to subordinates. It also, provides the basis for resource allocations and the execution checklist (Annex X). CMO planners must ensure that ant CMO activities are included in the MAGTF synchronization matrix, particularly in "CMO centric" missions.

| | Timeline/Event | Phase XX (Shaping) | Phase XX (Decisive) | Decisive 2B (Phase XX) | Sustaining (Phase XX) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Adversary Action | | | | |
| | Decision Points | | | | |
| Intel | NAIs | | | | |
| Intel | PIRs | | | | |
| Intel | Assets | | | | |
| Maneuver | ME/BLT | T: Defeat adversary reconnaissance south of XX | T: | T: | T: |
| Maneuver | ME/BLT | P: Ensure tactical surprise in Phase XX | P: | P: | P: |
| Maneuver | SE1/CLB | T: | T: Guard GCE's right (east/southeast) flank | T: | T: |
| Maneuver | SE1/CLB | P: | P: Allow exploitation to MEB OBJ X | P: | P: |
| Maneuver | SE2/ACE | T: | T: | T: | T: |
| Maneuver | SE2/ACE | P: | P: | P: | P: |
| Maneuver | SE3/CE | T: | T: | T: | T: |
| Maneuver | SE3/CE | P: | P: | P: | P: |
| Fires | Lethal | | Neutralize HPTs | | |
| Fires | FSCMs | | Establish FSCMs to support GCE | | |
| Fires | TAIs | | | | |
| Fires | Arty | | | | |
| Fires | Air | | | | |
| Fires | COMCAM | Document (photo/video) MEB Ops | | | |
| Fires | MISO | Influence civilian population in the AO | | | |
| Logistics | Maintenance | | | | |
| Logistics | Supply | Ensure adequate stockage of Class I, III, V | Establish resupply points for Class I, III, V | | |
| Logistics | Transportation | | | | |
| Logistics | Health Services | | | | |
| Logistics | Gen Engineering | Provide water and utilities | | | |
| Logistics | Services | | | | |
| C2 | Main | | | | |
| C2 | Forward | | | | |
| C2 | Jump | | | | |
| C2 | Retrans | | | | |
| Free Pro | | | | | |
| Free Pro | | | | | |
| Free Pro | | | | | |
| Information | CA | | | | |
| Information | COMMSTRAT | | | | |
| Information | PSYOP | | | | |

**Figure 4-2. Synchronization Matrix**

**m. Develop Supporting Concept.** Supporting concepts may be organized by warfighting functions, as well as selected activities (e.g., fire, information operations) requiring separate consideration. The staff prepares functional and supporting concepts for each COA to coordinate and integrate actions into a single, cohesive plan. Once the commander selects a COA, the supporting concepts inform the corresponding portions of the OPORD. CMO planners will develop the CMO supporting concept with input from the CMO Working Group and refine as necessary during the COA wargame.

**n. CMO Supporting Concept Graphic and Narrative.** The CMO supporting concept graphic and narrative portrays how CMO will be integrated into the MAGTF CONOPS for each COA. Usually, a map graphic is provided by the OPT, and the narrative is outlined "task/method/end state" in describing support activities. The graphic portrays the CMO activities to be conducted by the main and supporting efforts. The CMO narrative provides the purpose and tasks of the main effort, supporting efforts, and the reserve, plus the sequencing of the operation. The CMO

supporting concept graphic and narrative also, supports the development of the operations order (paragraph 3b and Annex G).




**o. Assessment Planning.** The requirement to assess the operations plan's tasks or objectives is paramount. To do this, the assessment plan must conform to the operational plan's general structure. The OPT and staff will develop MOEs, MOPs, as well devised evaluation measures can help the commander understand the relationship between desired effects and task accomplishment. MOEs are linked to desired effects and MOPs are linked to tasks. There is no requirement for there to be an MOE for every MOP or vice versa. The staff devises necessary critical questions and other metrics to observe and empirically evaluate the ever-changing operational environment to judge progress towards the desired end state and to inform decisions for future actions. The CMO planner should assist in developing the assessment plan and ensure that the civil information management (CIM) plan supports the civil information requirements outlined in the assessment plan.

**p. COA Development Brief.** Planners should brief each COA separately and use a standardized format to help focus the brief and prevent the omission of essential information. Briefs should be tailored to the needs of the commander and the time available. The CMO

planner and the green cell should collaborate to further develop CMO products (e.g., civil most likely and civil most disruptive actions) for the COA development brief.

## 4005. Course of Action Development Results

A COA must contain sufficient detail to facilitate COA wargaming. Following the COA development brief, planning products, facts, and assumptions are updated in preparation for the wargame. Results from COA development are:

**a. Commander's Designated COAs.** The commander will select or modify the COAs for wargaming. Depending on the time available for planning and the nature of the COAs developed.

**b. Commander's Wargaming Guidance.** Commander's wargaming guidance may include:

- Friendly COAs to be wargamed against specified adversary most likely or most dangerous COA as well as the civil most likely or most disruptive COA
- Timelines for the phases or stages of the operation
- Weather conditions to be assumed

**c. Commander's Evaluation Criteria.** Before the staff begins the COA War Game step, the commander must choose standards utilized by the staff and subordinates to determine the relative merit of each COA which may include:

- Command and control
- Logistics supportability
- Effects of weather
- Impact on local population/issues

# CHAPTER 5

## CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS SUPPORT TO COURSE OF ACTION WAR GAME

*"You can always amend a big plan, but you can never expand a little one. I don't believe in little plans. I believe in plans big enough to meet a situation which we can't possibly foresee now."*

*- Harry S. Truman, 33rd President of the United States*

### 5000. Introduction

The COA War Game is conducted to improve the COAs and refine as necessary considering adversary and civil capabilities in addition to the potential actions and reactions unique to the operational environment. Wargaming is a methodical process that helps determine the strengths, weaknesses, associated risks, and resource shortfalls for each COA and synchronizes the warfighting functions across the battlespace. A successful war game fosters a better understanding of the situation, which will lead to modified COAs that better reflect the problem planners are attempting to solve. When formally conducted, a well-run COA War Game can often be a time-consuming and arduous process, but the intuitive level of understanding gained reduces decision-making time in execution. Planners war game friendly COAs against selected adversary COAs through an iterative action / reaction / counteraction process. A red cell creates and fights adversary COAs, while a green cell develops probable responses and actions of the population and other civilian groups. This form of interaction coupled with feedback loops accounts for the nonlinear nature of military operations.

### 5001. Civil-Military Operations Planning Considerations

During the COA War Game step, CMO planners and the CMO working group assist the OPT in identifying most likely and most disruptive civil activities, associated risks, and asset shortfalls for each friendly COA from the civil prospective. The CMO planner should record CMO/CA refinement recommendations and identify possible CMO branches for further planning. During wargaming, green cell provides the civil actions in response to both blue and red actions. The green cell is to consider the population to promote a better understanding of the civil environment and the nature of the problem confronting the MAGTF. At a minimum, the green

cell provides for the independent will of the population. The green cell may also provide considerations for non-DOD entities, including IOs (e.g., United Nations, African Union, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, etc.) and NGOs. The CMO planner will capture the results of the war game and update the CMO staff estimate accordingly. Short of actually executing the COA, COA war gaming provides the most reliable basis for understanding and improving each COA.

## 5002. Injects, Activities, and Results Diagram for Course of Action War Game

Figure 5-1., depicts the injects, activities, and results for the COA War Game step. The results of this step provide the injects for the COA Comparison and Decision step. The information shown in bold highlights the commander's personal involvement during each part of this step.




**Figure 5-1. Injects, Activities, and Results Diagram for Course Of Action War Game**

## 5003. Course of Action War Game Injects

At the end of COA Development, the commander will translate the most important concerns into COA War Game guidance. For example, COA war game requires the commander's designated COAs, adversary COAs against which to war game, (e.g., most likely, most dangerous, and most advantageous to friendly forces), the method to be used in the COA War Game (e.g., avenue in depth, belt, box, or sequence of critical tasks), and the respective evaluation criteria. The

commander's evaluation criteria provide the lens used to analyze and assess COAs (COA Development FASDC). The commander will have specific concerns and/or questions that must be answered during the wargaming of each COA. While the commander may have "standing evaluation criteria" (such as limiting friendly casualties or flexibility in the plan) other criteria may be added specific to the situation. Generally, the COA war game step includes:

**a. War Game Rules.** These guidelines may be used to facilitate the war game and to avoid unintended interruptions.

- Use approved COAs
- War game each COA independently
- Stay on timeline
- Remain objective and unbiased
- Record war game results by "turn"
- Collect COA refinement recommendations

**b. Prepare for the War Game.** Preparation is critical to the flow and timeliness of the war game. It is important to ensure that there is time allotted for preparation, therefore, planners should post or have readily accessible the following information in addition to the war game injects:

- War game organization
- Planning support tools
- Synchronization matrix (warfighting functions or LOO construct)
- War Game Worksheet / War Game Method (used to organize and record friendly, adversary, and civil actions)
- Decision support template / matrix (depicts decision points and time phase lines associated with movement of adversary and friendly forces)

**c. War Game Organization.** In addition to those personnel involved throughout the planning process, a COA War Game requires the following assignments:

- **Facilitator**. Usually the OPT lead, helps keep the war game process focused and on track, settles disputes, and directs the actions of the group in accordance with the commander's wargaming guidance.

- **Arbiter**. The arbiter (chosen within the OPT or the staff) determines the outcomes of turns, assesses casualties (friendly and adversary personnel, as well as civilians) and losses (aircraft, vehicles, equipment, facilities, etc.), and adjudicates disagreements.
- **Recorder**. The recorder (OPT members) should keep track of all moves and results from gameplay and record the strengths and weaknesses of each COA. The recorded information will assist in the development of templates and matrices necessary to analyze COAs and support decision making.
- **Red Cell/Green Cell Leads**. These cells are used to portray adversary and local population reaction to friendly moves using doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures of their most likely most dangerous/disruptive COAs. The CMO planner may be intimately involved in the development of green cell products but should be coordinating with both the red cell and green cell to ensure a shared understanding of the operational environment.
- **Information Manager**. Information management may be the greatest challenge and a major time consumer if not organized properly. Quick access to relevant information and the ability to utilize force web sites and keep them updated to support commands/units by providing them access to current information and/or plans is vitally important.
- **Staff Participants**. The OPT Leader should ensure that the staff representatives are present and on time for the war game. Each staff function should be further developing their estimates as the wargame progresses.
- **Subject Matter Experts (SMEs)**. SMEs add important insight. If there is not a necessary core competency on the staff, request one from another command or organization. SMEs, e.g., IO, cultural, and Foreign Area Officers (FAO) may provide both full and/or part-time support to the OPT.

**d. Planning Support Tools.** There are planning documents and tools required to conduct a COA war game. As lessons and findings are discovered during the war game, the recorder or designated planning team member will note recommended additions, changes, and updates to record, track, and analyze critical planning information. The documents and tools used in support of the war game should include but are not limited to:

- **Synchronization Matrix**. This tool is used by the staff to synchronize the COA across time, space, and purpose in relation to an adversary COA. The CMO planner will ensure that CMO input is incorporated in the synch matrix. Depending on the type used, CMO may have its own functional row in the synchronization matrix, with the row used to record CMO activities throughout the COA.
- **War Game Worksheet**. Figure 5-2., depicts a worksheet used during the wargame to record the friendly action, adversary reaction, and friendly counteraction of each COA. It is also used to capture critical information identified during the war game, such as potential CCIRs, decision points, and named areas of interest. It is important to consider the commander's evaluation criteria and annotate comments as necessary in the remarks section.

| OPERATION CMOP RESPONSE | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **COA 1, Phase II, Stage A Box (War Game Method) MOST LIKELY (Adversary COA)** | | | | | | | |
| **Action** | **Reaction** | **Counter action** | **Assets** | **Approx. Time** | **Decision Point** | **CCIR** | **Remarks** |
| Sequence of Critical Tasks war game commences with 22d MEU establishing forward COC | Red - Adversary Reaction to "Blue"<br>Green - Civil Reaction to both "Blue" and "Red" | Blue counteraction to Red and Green reactions | List assets in "play" for the turn, e.g., MEU FWD CE, ACE Squadron, GCE Co. | Estimate time of turn, e.g., Est 72-96 hrs. | List DP associated with this turn, e.g., DP 1 reached prior to war game. Decision made for MEU Fwd to establish COC on XX. | Record potential CCIRs, e.g., MEU personnel exhibiting signs of Ebola infection | List relevant remarks, e.g., This stage must be complete prior to D+4. |

**Figure 5-2. War Game Worksheet**

- **Decision Support Template/Matrix (DST/DSM)**. The decision support template illustrates decision points, areas of interests associated with events or movement of friendly forces and adversaries, the flow of the operation, and other information required to enhance understanding of the friendly COA. Figure. 5-3, the decision support matrix provides a recap of expected events, decision points, and planned friendly actions in a narrative form. It shows when and where a decision must be made if a specific action(s) is to take place.

| DP | Events / Indic | NET / NLT | NAI | TAI | CMDR's OPTIONS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 50% Increase in DC Population within 48 hours | D-1 to D+14 | 1 | | Contact USEMB / Coordinate with HN / Increase flow of Basic Needs / Security |
| 2 | DC situation critical Death Rate exceeds 100/Day | D-1 to D+14 | 2 | | Prioritize Relief Supplies and Medical support to HN |
| 3 | USEMB/HN/International Community coordination meetings exceed capability of FCE | D-1 to D+30 | 6 | | Send additional personnel to augment FCE at USEMB |

**Figure 5-3. Decision Support Matrix**

**e. War Game Methods.** MCWP 5-10 lists four war game methods; each technique is suited for a particular situation considering time or type of command.

- **Sequence of Critical Tasks**. Critical tasks in sequence method is used by planners to determine timing, support requirements, and how critical tasks predisposes mission accomplishment. During COA war game, the OPT examines the accomplishment of critical tasks and to ensures they are listed in the correct sequence. If gaps are identified, a re-sequencing critical tasks maybe necessary.
- **Avenue in Depth**. This method is used to focus on one avenue of approach at a time, beginning with the main effort. This method is good for offensive COAs or defensive situations when canalizing terrain inhibits mutual support.
- **Belt**. The Belt method is used to emphasize synchronization of simultaneous events. It divides the terrain into belts running the width of the area of operations. The belt technique is most effective when the terrain is divided into well-defined cross-compartments; during phased operations; or when the adversary deployed in clearly defined echelons or belts. A belt will normally include more than one event. When time is short, the commander may use a modified belt technique, such as noncontiguous belts selected on the basis of anticipated critical events, which may or may not occur at the same time.

- **Box**. The Box method is used to concentrate on critical events within specific geographic boundaries. It is most useful when time is limited and to analyze critical events and decision points in a specified area, such as engagement areas or a landing zone. The OPT isolates the area and focuses on the critical events within that area.

**f. General Rules.** Time is critical to the flow and preparation of the war game. It is important to ensure that there is time allotted for preparation. Therefore, planners should post or have readily accessible the following information:

- War Game injects
- War Game organization
- Planning support tools (i.e. synch matrix, war Game worksheet, DSM)

**g. War Game Rules.** These guidelines may be used to facilitate the war game and to avoid unintended interruptions. Prior to the execution of the war game, the facilitator leads a discussion that includes the following:

- War game each COA independently
- Stay on timeline
- Use approved COAs
- Remain objective and unbiased
- Record war game results by "turn"
- Collect COA refinement recommendations

## 5004. Course of Action War Game Activities

**a. Red Cell Brief.** The red cell ensures relevant threat capabilities and vulnerabilities are realistically evaluated against each friendly COA. The red cell will brief the adversary most likely and most dangerous COAs and present doctrinally based adversary reactions to friendly actions.

**b. Green Cell Brief.** The green cell portrays the role of a thinking and independent civil populace during the wargame. It uses historical and operational experience to react to friendly force actions as well as the actions of the adversary. The green cell ensures relevant civil

capabilities and vulnerabilities are realistically evaluated against each friendly COA. A member of the green cell should be present throughout the war game, but there should be a distinction between the green cell member and the CMO planner. The green cell will brief the civil most likely and most disruptive COAs (see Figure 5-4). These civil COAs should include:

- CPB key influences
- Government reactions
- International / nongovernmental organizations' reactions
- HN security forces reactions
- HN civil leadership reactions
- Populace reactions
- Cultural and civil relationships in the battlespace

| Green Cell Civil Actions Matrix | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Key Influence (KI):** Identification of person, place, thing, or intangible factor | **Actions:** Any sequence of activities that may follow; concise description and 5 Ws as applicable | **Objective:** Rationale and purpose of the actions taken | **Comments:** |
| The Ramtha City Merchants Association | Agrees to cooperate with the coalition project plan due to potential economic benefits / contract awards to their businesses | To encourage continued coalition funding that will benefit the association | |
| Populace | Will migrate to the nearest DC camp causing over crowding and disruption in the camp | To flee from violence in local area to security and seek HA | |

**Figure 5-4. Green Cell Civil Actions Matrix**

**c. CMO Working Group War Game Rehearsal.** The CMO working group should conduct its war game rehearsal (blue, red, and green actions) prior to the OPT's war game. This provides an opportunity for the working group to identify gaps in the CMO supporting concept prior to these issues being highlighted during the war game. Additionally, the internal war game may identify gaps in the friendly COA that require refinements prior to the OPT war game. The CMO working group should focus on the following questions:

- Does the COA achieve the intended purpose of the operation?
- Does the COA solve the problem?
- Are there enough resources available to achieve the required CMO actions?
- Does the COA accomplish the mission?

**d. War Game Turn.** A *turn* involves a sequence of moves; a move may be a friendly force action, adversary/civil reactions, and a friendly force counteraction. A turn is used to examine the COA for any unanticipated adversary/civil actions that would require the friendly force to change its COA or prepare a branch plan. The model used to examine each COA is referred to as a turn, it:

- Covers all friendly, adversary, and civil actions that are planned to occur during a specific time interval.
- Focuses on specific tasks or events.
- One Friendly (counteraction).
- The first "turn" usually take twice as long as subsequent "turns."

**e. Conduct COA War Game Turn.** The COA War Game itself consists of one or more turns. In most instances, a turn includes the discussion of three steps, as described below: friendly action, anticipated reaction of adversaries and the local population, and friendly counteraction.

- **Friendly Action**. Friendly force commanders or their representatives during the COA War Game describe the operations of all forces involved during this event. They describe the force, its mission, tasks, and the desired outcome. They annotate the force list to account for all forces employed in the event, while moving icons on a map or electronic overlay if physical positioning is applicable.
- **Adversary Reaction**. The red cell will react to friendly actions by briefing the adversary's (or the element that represents a threat to friendly success) actions according to its plan, and similarly moving icons. The red cell lead describes current adversary activities, followed by the relevant forces outside the immediate area of operations, but within the area of interest they intend to employ during this event. Friendly wargamers can then validate the portion of their plan or higher and adjacent plans that address these

additional adversary forces. The red cell lead and friendly commanders determine where they will have contact. The red cell lead describes the locations and activities of all assets identified as high-value targets (HVTs). Also, highlighting points during the operation where these assets are important to the adversary's COA. If these points affect the friendly COA, friendly wargamers identify the HVTs as high-payoff targets (HPTs), making their engagement an integral part of the friendly COA. With this information, planners update the situation and event templates to reflect tactical areas of interest that support the engagement of those HPTs.

- **Civilian Reaction.** The green cell will provide likely civilian responses to both friendly and adversary actions, as well as the agenda and objectives of any relevant civilian initiatives. The OPT discusses the impact of the contact on friendly and adversary forces and the population, recording tools capture the discussion. If the OPT members agree on the outcome, the game turn proceeds. If they do not agree, the arbiter determines the outcome and the war game proceeds.
- **Friendly Counteraction**. The counteraction will require some degree of synthesis in order to respond to the adversary and civilian actions. The war game facilitator determines the outcome, whether failure, success, losses, or casualties, as a basis for the next turn. The war game continues until the entire avenue of approach, belt(s), key event, or sequence of essential tasks has been thoroughly wargamed.

**f. War Game Preparation.** To examine and test the details of timelines, support requirements, combat power, etc., war games generally depict and exercise units two levels down. For example, MEF wargamers will represent the wing and division commanders, including all aircraft groups and infantry regiments on their force list as well as all separate battalions, such as the light armored reconnaissance battalion and tank battalion. Because commanders frequently task-organize forces, wargamers should also list the number of subordinate units in each element (e.g., one regiment is currently operating with two battalions, another with three). Similarly, the wargamer employing the ACE would be expected to know the number of squadrons in each group (by type) and the number of aircraft in each squadron.

- Facilitators create beforehand and use a master scenario events list (MSEL) consisting of plausible war- and mission-related events, acts, crises, etc. that could occur during the

operation and can be used to test the overall plan. During wargaming turns, the facilitator injects items from the MSEL to further test and examine aspects of the overall plan and each of the COAs. Examples of MSEL items include a friendly aircraft collision during an air assault, which would examine the tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (TRAP) and other related responses in detail; a mass casualty event, which would examine the casualty evacuation capabilities and response times to role I, II, and III facilities; and an adversary unit surrender, which would examine the comprehensive enemy prisoners of war (EPW) and detainee plan and associated support requirements.

- During each COA's war game, planners develop the decision support template (DST) and decision support matrix (DSM). The DST and DSM depict decision points, refined NAIs, target areas of interest (TAIs), time phase lines, and other key information gleaned or validated during COA wargaming and is included in the operation order. The focus of COA wargaming is on improving the plan, vice the completion of the game. The facilitator is therefore responsible for determining when each turn has met the objectives of the war game, in accordance with wargaming guidance, the established timeline, and the facilitator and lead planner's judgment.

## 5005. Course of Action War Game Results

The result of the war game informs COA Comparison and Decision, but, more importantly, wargaming generates an intuitive level of understanding about the problem that accelerate decision-making during execution. Required results from COA War Game are the war gamed COA graphic and narrative, approved COAs for COA Comparison and Decision, and planning support product refinements to include:

- IPB
- CPB
- COA war game worksheet and the synchronization matrix
- War game results such as task organization, identification of assets and forces required and shortfalls, refined CCIRs, and the list of critical events and decision points
- Refined staff estimates and subordinate estimates of supportability and supporting concepts.

The staff and subordinate commands continue to develop their estimates and supporting concepts. These estimates and supporting concepts are critical to the COA Comparison and Decision step and eventually become a part of the plan or order. The CMO planner will use the war game results to refine CMO staff estimates, summarizing the civil impact on each COA in preparation for COA Comparison and Decision step with the commander. The updated CMO estimate is critical to the CMO planner's ability to recommend a COA to the commander that best accomplishes his mission from the civil perspective.

**a. Branches and Sequels for Further Planning**

- **Branch**. The contingency options built into the base plan used for changing the mission, orientation, or direction of movement of a force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by adversary actions and reactions. (JP 1-02)
- **Sequel**. The subsequent major operation or phase based on the possible outcomes (success, stalemate, or defeat) of the current major operation or phase (JP 5-0). It should be noted that a sequel requires its own OPT.

**b. Commander's Comparison and Decision Guidance.** The COA War Game brief concludes with the commander's approval of the updated COAs, or any recommended changes to the original COAs, before they are compared. The commander also can take this time to provide guidance for the comparison of the COAs, such as the type of COA comparison input expected from the staff.

# CHAPTER 6

# CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS SUPPORT TO COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON AND DECISION

*"The ultimate purpose of collecting the data is to provide a basis for action or a recommendation."*

*- Dr. W. Edwards Deming*

*"When all is said and done the greatest quality required in Commanders is 'decision'..."*

-Montgomery of Alamein, *Memoirs*, 1958

## 6000. Introduction

During COA Comparison and Decision, commanders evaluate each friendly COA against established criteria, compares the COAs, and selects the COA they believe will best accomplish the mission. This step is commonly referred to as the "Commander's Step." During this step the commander leads a discussion with the staff and subordinates about the relative merits of each COA. The CMO planner, as a part of the OPT is in a supporting role ensuring that the planning guidance is understood. Furthermore, CMO planners provides support products to the commander, staff, and subordinate leadership as early as possible to inform a detail COA Comparison and Decision discussion. Planners then accurately record the process results and any updates as required.

## 6001. Civil-Military Operations Planning Considerations

Successful accomplishment of CMO in large part depends on adequate plans and policy determinations, staff capabilities, and the availability of dedicated CA resources to assist the commander. Since military operations are non-linear by nature, and the smallest input can have a disproportional effect, the numerical weighting of factors alone offers limited insight into the merits of one COA over another. CMO planners provide commanders the knowledge and analytical/operational capabilities for CA related decisions, actions that clearly portrays the commander's legal and ethical obligations and facilitates the achievement of military objectives and the desired endstate.

## 6002. Injects, Activities, and Results Diagram for Course of Action Comparison and Decision

Figure 6-1. depicts the injects, activities, and results for the COA Comparison and Decision step. The results of this step provide the injects for the COA Orders Development step. The information shown in bold highlights the commander's personal involvement during each part of this step.




**Figure 6-1. Injects, Activities, and Results Diagram for Course Of Action Comparison and Decision**

## 6003. Course of Action Comparison and Decision Injects

The planners will complete the COA evaluation worksheet in preparation for the commander's COA Comparison and Decision discussion. Planners use the commander's evaluation criteria as well as their own judgment to analyze each COA independently and record the analysis on the COA evaluation worksheet. Once complete, the planners create a draft COA Comparison and Decision worksheet used to compare COAs against each other and to record the results. CMO planners should ensure that all planning support products developed during the previous steps are brought forward to support the COA comparison and decision process. A helpful method used to facilitate dialogue during this step is to post various planning support products on the bulkhead.

Ideally, this technique would offer multiple perspectives to deepen the group's understanding of the environment and the problem set.

## 6004. Course of Action Comparison and Decision Activities

The COA comparison and decision process at lower levels of command might be an informal exchange of information between the commander and selected staff members concerning the results of the wargame. At higher levels of command, the process is normally a formal sequence of activities. There are three major activities conducted during this step: an evaluation, a comparison, and the selection of a COA.

**a. COA Evaluation.** During the evaluation process, the commander's designated COAs are evaluated against the commander's evaluation criteria. Designated members of the staff identify the advantages, disadvantages, and risks of each COA relative to the commander's evaluation criteria and record their results in the appropriate planning support tool, Figure 6-2.

| Commander's Evaluation Criteria | COA 1 |
|---|---|
| Command and control | Requires greater communication and coordination with local leadership |
| Simplicity | Requires less coordination - US controls support assets and operational oversight |
| Responsiveness | High probability for the adversary to provide HA support before Host Nation is decisively engaged |
| Logistical Supportability | Lacks communications to those needing the relief |
| Fewer DCs on the MSRs | HN and local security forces /police patrols are capable of providing security along the MSRs |
| Effects of weather | Requires ~ a mile of visibility for the ACE to support relief supply drops |
| Risk | Convoys bringing in relief supplies within range of adversary rocket launchers |

**Figure 6-2. Course Of Action Evaluation Matrix**

**b. COA Comparison.** During the comparison process, COAs are compared against one another using the recorded results from the COA evaluation process. The results from the comparison process informs the commander's understanding of the relative merit of each COA. A COA comparison and decision matrix is used to aid in the selection process, Figure 6-3.

| Criteria | Weight | COA #1 | COA #2 | COA #3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fewer DCs on MSRs (faster Movement) | 4 | 3 / 12 | 2 / 8 | 1 / 4 |
| Avoid collateral damage | 2 | 2 / 4 | 2 / 4 | 3 / 6 |
| Engage key leaders | 1 | 2 / 2 | 1 / 1 | 3 / 3 |
| Gains cooperation of civilian populace | 1 | 2 / 2 | 1 / 1 | 3 / 3 |
| Preserves key infrastructure | 2 | 3 / 6 | 2 / 4 | 1 / 2 |
| Amount of HA likely to be needed | 2 | 1 / 2 | 2 / 4 | 3 / 6 |
| TOTALS | | 28 | 22 | 24 |

**Notes**: 1. Best COA is assigned the highest value of the three COAs.
2. Formula to compute value is to multiply weight times ranking (1, 2, or 3) for that COA
3. Highest number is most likely COA

**Figure 6-3. Course Of Action Comparison and Decision Matrix**

**c. Commander's Decision.** After completing the comparison process, the staff and subordinate commanders are prepared to discuss the results of their analysis and provide recommendations to inform the commander's decision-making. In making the decision, the commander may:

- Select a COA (without modification)
- Modify a COA (mitigate risk or overcome disadvantages)
- Develop a new COA (combine favorable elements of multiple COAs)
- Discard all COAs (resume Problem Framing and COA Development)

Once a decision is made, the commander should review the approved COA with subordinate commanders. This review is conducted to facilitate detailed planning on a single COA by the entire command.

## 6005. Course of Action Comparison and Decision Results

**a. Concept of Operations.** The staff prepares a concept of operations, which is integral to the orders development step. The concept of operations is the basis for supporting concepts, such as fires, logistics, and CMO. Included in the concept of operations is a general description of the forces' required and actions in pursuit of mission accomplishment.

**b. Issue the Warning Order.** After the staff prepares the concept of operations, the commander may issue a new warning order or update an existing warning order to allow the subordinate commanders to continue concurrent planning.

**c. Refine and Update Planning Support Products.** Because the situation in the battlespace is ever evolving, the staff continues to refine and update planning products, such as:

- IPB
- CPB
- CCIRs
- DST and DSM
- Staff estimates and estimate of supportability
- Branch plans identified by the commander

# CHAPTER 7

## CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS SUPPORT TO ORDERS DEVELOPMENT

*"As a rule, plans should contain only as much detail as required to provide subordinates the necessary guidance while allowing as much freedom of action as possible."*

*- MCDP 5, Planning*

### 7000. Introduction

The MCPP Orders Development step is designed to communicate the commander's decision in a clear, useful form that those executing the order can easily understand. An order is a written or oral communication that directs actions and focuses subordinates' tasks and activities toward accomplishing the mission. The development of the order begins during Problem Framing and continues throughout the planning process. The order contains critical information and necessary details required for successful execution and assessments by the force.

### 7001. Civil-Military Operations Planning Considerations

CMO planners must be knowledgeable and capable of operationalizing the broader concept of CMO/CAO in support of the commander's directive. CMO planners must focus on the intended audience (organic units, attachments, augments, sister service supporting elements, coalition forces, etc.) during the orders development process to ensure that the commander's intent for CMO is met. For example, many of these external elements will not be familiar with the publishing command's SOP, so the planning directive may contain selected portions of the SOP or doctrinal references. Additionally, it must provide the reader with a sufficient understanding of the overall plan to facilitate integration of functional capabilities and the nesting of tasks and the unity of effort among commands to enhance the single battle concept. An order typically consists of a basic order, annexes, And appendices with text and graphics.

## 7002. Injects, Activities, and Results Diagram for Orders Development




**Figure 7-1. Injects, Activities, and Results Diagram for Orders Development**

## 7003. Orders Development Injects

If applicable, the updated version of the approved COA (task organization, graphic and narrative, synchronization matrix, and supporting concepts) is a primary input to the orders development process. Other inputs may include, but not limited to are:

- Mission statement
- Commander's intent and guidance
- Higher Headquarters orders (OPORD, FRAGO, WARNORD)
- Updated IPB and CPB Products
- Updated CCIRs
- Branches and sequels
- Operation assessment plan
- WARNORD/planning orders
- Existing plans and orders
- Staff estimates

## 7004. Orders Development Activities

The overall concept of operations (CONOPS) is the basis for supporting concepts, planners, and their supporting staff sections, to proceed with the functional and detailed planning essential for the development of the order and its implementation during the conduct of operations.

**a. Prepare the Order.** Orders development produces an operations order that expresses the commander's intent, guidance, and assigns tasks to subordinates. There are two guiding principles for orders writing, - doctrine and usefulness. Orders are written for those who execute them, not the OPT and staff that develop them. Language and writing style are important, but orders should always be clear, simple, and concise. Staff estimates, estimates of supportability, and other planning documents drives the development of the annexes and appendices to an order. If a basic order has been published, a fragmentary order may be issued to subordinate commanders.

An order ensures common understanding across the force. CMO planners and their respective staffs are responsible for the refinement of CPB products, CMO input to the basic order, completing the Annex G (CMO), and associated appendices and tabs. CMO information relevant to the entire command should be a part of the Execution paragraphs (3b, 3c, and 3f) of the order. This might be the only place that other units will read, activities relating to CMO. CMO planners must ensure that the concept of CMO is accurately reflected in paragraph 3b, Concept of Operations. CMO tasks identified in the planning process should be included in paragraph 3c and paragraph 3f (note: coordinating instructions—include those CMO tasks involving two or more units). The Annex G is the vehicle used to amplify and clarify CMO requirements found within the basic operation order. It provides the necessary details pertaining to CMO activities, assessments, or coordination aspect that are too voluminous, or of insufficient general interest, such as, civil environment models, overlays, graphs, or tables, for the body of the order. To ensure that the order is free of errors, gaps, or omissions, the orders development process includes two essential quality control techniques orders reconciliation and orders crosswalk.

**b. Orders Reconciliation.** Orders reconciliation is a process internal to the command during which the planners review in detail the entire order, to ensure that the basic order and all annexes, appendices, and other attachments are complete and in agreement. The intent is to identify discrepancies or gaps in planning as well as in the written order that may require corrective action. Specifically, the OPT and staff compares the commander's intent, the mission, and the CCIRs against the CONOPS, and the supporting concepts, to ensure that the order captures accurately what was planned.

**c. Orders Crosswalk.** Orders crosswalk is an external process in which the planners compare the completed, draft OPORD with the orders of higher, adjacent, and subordinate commanders to achieve unity of effort. Additionally, the orders crosswalk ensures the CONOPS aligns, or nests, with the higher commander's intent.

**d. Approve the Order.** The final action in the orders development process is the approval of the order by the commander. While the commander does not have to sign every annex or appendix, it is important that the order or plan be reviewed by the commander before it is signed.

## 7005. Orders Development Results

The result of the Orders Development step is a signed operations order (a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation) or plan, complete with necessary annexes, appendices, and tabs. It is not only the responsibility for the CMO planner to write the Annex G, but also provide input to other annexes such as, the Annex V (Interagency) and Annex P (Host Nation Support). The format for orders development is contained in MCWP 5-10 (appendix K) and CJCSM 3130.03 [Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance].

# CHAPTER 8

## CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS SUPPORT TO TRANSITION

*"… plans and orders exist for those who receive and execute them rather than those who write them."*

*- MCDP 5, Planning*

## 8000. Introduction

Transition is the final step of the MCPP. Transition is designed to enhance situational awareness and to ensure a successful shift of from planning to execution. Transition is subject to a number of variables, such as command echelon, mission complexity, and most importantly time. It also accounts for the human element, by taking a holist view on learning, adopting a blended approach that aids in how Marines best learn and process information. Simply sending a signed order to staffs and subordinates, and expecting successful comprehension and implementation is unwise.

Transition is used to facilitate understanding by, with, and through a free flow of information between commanders and staffs. It may also involve a wide range of briefs, drills, or rehearsals. Transition enhances the command's understanding of the operational environment, it includes a CONOPS brief along with a handover and explanation of any execution tools developed during planning. Transition promotes unity of effort, generates tempo, and facilitates initiative. It may be internal, external, and possibly involve the relocation of a planner to current operations (COPS) for execution.

- **Internal transition** occurs when the OPT moves its plan to execution, future operations (FOPS) briefs the order to COPS to ensure an understanding of the written order by those responsible for executing it.
- **External transition** occurs when the future operations (FOPS) section briefs the order to the subordinate commanders and their planning staffs. Subordinate commanders will conduct a confirmation brief to higher headquarters to express their understanding of the commander's operational approach, CONOPS, and sequencing.

## 8001. Civil-Military Operations Planning Considerations

CMO planners must understand that at lower levels of command, CA personal are nonexistent or limited at best. Therefore, CMO planners should consider how best to enhance the situational awareness of the civil operating environment to those executing the CMO concept of support. CMO planners must ensure that all required CMO activities within the command are relevant, integrated, resourced, and harmonized into all transition events to increase the force's understanding of the commander's approved CMO/CAO activities outlined in the order.

## 8002. Injects, Activities, and Results Diagram for Transition




**Figure 8-1. Injects, Activities, and Results Diagram for Transition**

## 8003. Transition Injects

There are several planning tools (Synch Matrix, DST, DSM, etc.) used to support the transition step. However, for transition to occur, an approved order must exist. The order is the primary tool used during transition because it communicates vital information, such as, the task organization, mission statement, commander's intent, CONOPS, and tasks. The order should contain concept matrices and other results of detailed planning, to include, the supporting concepts (fires, logistics, etc.) and annexes (CMO, Interagency, etc.). The order should be made

available as soon as possible, to assist in the preparation of briefs and/or drills. It is the most widely disseminated planning product, largely, because not everyone can attend the scheduled transition briefings and/or drills. Along with the order, there are a variety of other support products produced during planning needed to amplify critical and detailed information. These inputs may include, refined IPB and CPB products, staff estimates, estimates of supportability, updated CCIRs, decision support matrix, and branches for further planning.

## 8004. Transition Activities

**a. Transition Events.** Transition events may involve briefings, guided discussions, walk-throughs, or rehearsals used to facilitate understanding of the plan throughout all levels of the command. Details common to transition events include:

- OPSEC requirements
- Location and venue
- Audio-visual requirements
- Required attendees and briefers
- Fidelity of terrain model
- Use of decision support tools
- Review of execution checklists

**b. Transition Event Methods.** During the transition step the OPT, commanders, and staffs may perform the following:

- **Formal Transition Brief.** Transition occurs at all levels of command, at the higher levels of command, usually a formal transition brief is given to subordinate and adjacent commanders and staffs supervising the execution of the order. The commander, deputy commander or executive officer provides transition brief guidance which may include, the number of required briefers and who will brief, briefing content, and briefing order. At lower levels, a transition brief might be less formal. The brief should include but is not limited to the following:
    - Situation (adversary and friendly)
    - Mission

- Commander's operational approach
- Task Organization
- Concept of operations and supporting concepts
- Assumptions (planning)
- Commander's critical information requirements
- Operation assessment
- Execution (including branches and potential sequels)

- **Transition Drills.** Transition drills are important activities used to improve commanders and staff's ability to command and control operations. Commanders may also use transition drills to amplify their design, increase subordinate commanders and their staffs' situational awareness, and to instill confidence and understanding of the order. Transition drill may include sand table exercises, map exercises, and rehearsal of concept (ROC) drills.
  - ROC drills are techniques used to review an order or selected aspects of an order. They may be conducted in many ways, but be sure to determine the details in advance, such as the 5Ws.
  - During a ROC drill, all relevant units and warfighting functions participate in a "dry run" or a rehearsal to facilitate their understanding of the plan. A productive ROC drill is characterized by the willingness of the participants to recognize and address gaps in the plan. The ROC drill can also serve as a venue for a confirmation brief.
- **Confirmation Brief.** Subordinate commanders conduct a confirmation brief with their higher commander to confirm their understanding of the commander's operational approach, mission, specific tasks and purpose, relationship between units, and the CONOPS. A confirmation brief also allows the commander an opportunity to discuss gaps in coordination and to identify inconsistencies between the commander's operational approach and subordinate commander's plans, adds clarity to the purpose of the operation, priority of support, and to address any outstanding resource shortfalls. A confirmation brief may be executed in conjunction with external drills such as, sand table exercises, map exercises, rehearsals, or PowerPoint briefs.

**c. Transition Events vs. Time.** Deciding on a transition event can be challenging. It may vary depending on the complexity of the mission, size of the unit, and time available. Events can take on the form of a transition brief to a full-dress rehearsal. The greater the details provided, the greater the collective understanding by those who must execute the order. Given more time, detail-oriented preparation, and resources available; the more complex the transition event the more difficult it is to execute and potentially a greater operation security risk. It is important not to equate complexity with effectiveness. Keep "KISS" in mind. At a minimum, conduct a transition and/or a confirmation brief. At lower levels of command, the transition process takes place inherently as the planners are also the executors.

## 8005. Transition Results

A successful transition is achieved when commanders and staffs are ready to execute the order and possible branches and prepared to plan sequels. CMO planners must assist by ensuring that CMO activities are properly understood by those tasked in the order to execute them. The work of the OPT does not end after the order has been transitioned. The planning process continues as planners work to develop or plan for the execution of potential contingencies and/or sequels.

# APPENDIX A

## CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS STAFF ESTIMATE

**Introduction**. During planning, estimates are a primary means of informing the commander. Keeping commanders informed to facilitate their decision-making is a critical requirement of planning. Commanders and staffs use estimates as they collect, process, and evaluate information. The staff summarizes significant aspects of the situation that influence the COA, analyzes the impact of the factors on the COA, and evaluates and determines how the resources available can best support each COA. Staff estimates evolve into supporting concepts and supports the development of the functional Annex, as COAs are developed. Once the commander approves a COA, the staff estimate and supporting concept become the first draft of their respective portion of the order or plan.

We have added items to help stimulate thought, and to provide some ***examples*** of what type of information should be captured in these areas.

**CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS (CMO) STAFF ESTIMATE NUMBER: 00X**

**REFERENCES.** *List relevant documents. Include any maps, charts, documents, regulations and publications relevant to this estimate.*

1. **Higher**
   a. **Higher's Mission** *verbatim*
   b. **Higher's Commander's Intent**
      (1) Purpose
      (2) Method
      (3) Endstate
      (a) Adversary. *Information vital to the entire command, it contains disposition, intent, objectives, vulnerabilities, centers of gravity, and course of action.*

(b) Friendly. *Information on own forces having a bearing on the operation (higher, adjacent, and subordinate).*

(c) Environment. *Information relevant to the civil environment.*

2. **Situation and Civil Considerations**

a. **Area of Operations**

(1) Weather. *State how weather affects CMO/CAO capabilities.*

(2) Terrain. *State how terrain affects CMO/CAO capabilities.*

(3) Adversary Forces. *Include key CMO/CAO factors from the intelligence estimate and area assessments. Address adversary capabilities by considering sabotage, espionage, subversion, terrorism, noncombatant movement, and noncombatant ability to influence or affect planned military operation and CMO/CAO.*

(4) Friendly Forces. *List current CAO resources in terms of equipment, personnel, and systems. Identify additional resources located at higher, adjacent, or other units/organizations (IOs, NGO, HN, etc.) available to support CMO/CAO.*

b. **Civil Planning Consideration**. *Using CPB products and results, describe the operational environment and the effects of the civilian population on the military operations, and vice versa.*

(1) Stability / Instability Dynamics. *State the Grievances and Resiliencies within the society and the Key Influences that may leverage those Grievances and Resiliencies SOI/SOS Matrices.*

(2) Cultural Environment. *The beliefs, economy, political structure, physical structure, practices, customs, and behaviors of the population. Five dimensions of Operational Culture (Appendix B of Operational Culture for the Warfighter) derived from the operational culture matrix.*

(3) Local Perceptions. *Understanding of the local situation, such as the status and character of the HN government and the attitudes and conditions of the population (supportive, neutral, unsupportive).*

c. **CMO Assessment of the Physical Environment**. *Key influences Civil Environment Model*

3. **Mission** *See Basic Order*

a. **Commander's Planning Guidance**

b. **Task Analysis**

(1) CMO Specified Tasks

(a) Implied tasks

(b) Implied tasks

(2) CMO Specified Tasks

(a) Implied tasks

(b) Implied tasks

c. **CMO Problem Statement**. *Usually constrained to a single sentence and can oversimplify the challenges within the operating environment from the perspective of executing required CMO/CAO*.

d. **Recommended Essential Task(s)**. *The CMO "what" for the mission statement*

e. **CMO Assumptions**. *List all assumptions that affect CMO/CAO (assumed to be true in order to continue planning).*

f. **CMO Limitations**. *Identify constraints (things you must do) and restraints (things cannot do) that do qualify as specified tasks, while reviewing the appropriate orders and planning products.*

g. **CMO Shortfalls**. *Compare requirements to current capabilities, and recommend solutions for satisfying discrepancies, be specific!*

h. **CMO Requests for Information**. *Request for information from higher necessary to remove assumptions, support future plans or conduct current operations.*

i. **Recommended CMO CCIRs**. *Requirements identified by the commander as essential to the decision-making process from the CMO/CAO perspective*.

j. **Course(s) of Action**

(1) Commander's COA Development Guidance.

(2) CMO Narrative. *CMO/CAO actions in support of the CMO supporting concept – sequential.*

(a) **Phase I**

1. Main Effort. *CMO/CAO elements*
2. Supporting Effort #1.

(b) **Phase II**

4. **Analysis.** *Analyze each COA using the commander's evaluation criteria. Review adversary actions that affect CMO/CAO as they relate to COAs. Identify disadvantages, issues, and risks these adversary actions may create with respect to CMO/CAO.*

a. **Evaluation Criteria**. *Using the evaluation criteria provided by the commander during COA development.*

(1) Command and Control. *(e.g., The Civil Information Management plan is overlayed in a means to facilitate decision making. Information requirements are collected at the CA team level in conjunction with IO and NGO partners)*

(2) Logistical Supportability. *(e.g., The Class I and VI supplies for initial issue and follow on missions are on hand in depots. The distribution of these supplies has been requested through JTF. NGOs and IOs already operating in the Niger Delta region IDP camps own those supplies and are vested in their distribution directly to the populace. The priority choices for movement are TACAIR, military convoy and local hire)*

b. **Comparison**. *Compare COAs, rank order COAs for each evaluation criteria (For each COA, evaluate CMO deficiencies and list the advantages and disadvantages to mission accomplishment). Use the approved matrix to aid the comparison process.*

5. **Recommendation and Conclusions**

a. *Recommend the most supportable COAs from the perspective of executing required CMO/CAO.*

b. *List the major CMO deficiencies/risks that must be brought to the commander's attention. Include specific recommendations on how to mitigate any deficiencies/risks.*

# APPENDIX B

## ANNEX G (CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS)

**Introduction**. Commanders and staffs use Annex G to describe how CMO/CAO, in coordination with other military and civil organizations support the CONOPS described in the base plan or order. CMO Planners prepare the CMO annex based on the previously completed CMO estimate. This annex provides substantive guidance and understanding for planning the conduct of CMO/CAO activities and operations. The annex follows the five-paragraph format: situation, mission, execution, administration and logistics, and command and signal (SMEAC). The Annex G can have an unspecified number of appendices, but it typically has at least three:

- **Execution Matrix**
- **CIM Plan**
- **PRC Plan**

Other elements of the Annex G may include Tabs, Exhibits and Attachments that capture relevant information from the CPB process (e.g., stakeholder analysis, civil factors and relevance, civil environment model, etc.) or other staffing efforts (Green Cell products). In addition to the development of the Annex G, the CMO planner/G-9 staff is involved in the development of Annex V (Interagency Coordination), in conjunction with the assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3), or the battalion or regimental operations staff officer (S-3) and operations staff. The CMO planner/G-9 staff must also take great interest in the development of Annex P (Host-Nation Support). For information relating to proper formatting, see MCWP 5-10, Marine Corps Planning Process.

We have added items to help stimulate thought, and to provide some ***examples*** of what type of information should be captured in these areas.

**ANNEX G TO OPERATION ORDER 01-XX (OPERATION CMOP)**

**CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS (CMO)**

**REFERENCES**. *List maps, charts, SOPS, or other documents essential to understanding of this annex.*

1. **Situation**. *Summarize the overall operational situation as it relates to CMO/CAO.*

a. **General**. *Emphasize areas affecting displaced persons, government stability, and destruction or degradation of civilian infrastructure.*

(1) Overview. *Summarize the conditions of the battlespace as they may influence the operation. Do not repeat the information included in the general situation paragraph.*

(2) Host Nation Government. *(sub paragraph example)*

(3) Population. *(sub paragraph example)*

(4) Economics. *(sub paragraph example)*

b. **Adversary**. *Refer to Annex B, Intelligence. Also, assess the impact of adversary capabilities and probable COA on the CMO situation, with particular emphasis on identifying requirements for civil affairs functions and activities. Summarize the expected CMO situation, including government institutions, customs and attitudes of the population, and availability of indigenous resources.*

c. **Friendly**. *State the CMO activities to be performed by higher, adjacent, and subordinate units in addition to civilian authorities of the U.S. and friendly governments in the operational area. Identify local indigenous assets available to support and assist in CMO/CAO activities.*

(1) Higher

(2) Adjacent

(3) Subordinate

(4) USG Interagency. *Assess the ability of key interagency organizations operating in the AO to support the unit's CAO mission. Include the agency's missions, capabilities, capacity, and coordination POCs if not listed in Annex V. Identify known unit requirements to support interagency operations.*

(a) U.S. Department of State (DoS).

(b) U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

(c) Host Nation (HN). *Identify and state the interest, objective or goals and primary tasks of in the AO (including the HN military).*

d. **Assumptions**. *List the basic assumptions on which CMO planning are based, with particular attention to adversary COAs, availability of indigenous resources, and conclusion of necessary agreements with foreign governments on forces. Consider making appropriate assumptions concerning U.S. policy, international and civil-military agreements, adversary COAs, and availability of host-nation resources.*

e. **Legal Considerations**. *Identify the legal basis for, and expected scope of, CMO/CAO activities during this operation and include identification of pertinent international and civil-military agreements.*

2. **Mission**. *See Basic Order*

3. **Execution**

a. **Commander's Intent**. *See Basic Order*

b. **Concept of Operations**. *Describe how CMO/CAO will support the overall operation – sequential and anonymous. The concept should encompass the following – operational variations due to alternate COAs; flexible deterrent options (FDOs); time-phasing of the operation; deployment and employment of forces for CAO; scope and duration, to include post-conflict CMO (e.g., FHA, PRC ); clear and concise end-states in CMO/CAO activities, subdivided as necessary, to describe the successful completion of each phase and COA; planned allocation and use of military units and resources for the performance of CA functions; principal CA functions to be performed within the command area; function and operation of CMOCs, if they are to be established.*

(1) CMO/CAO Actions by Phase. *Sequential but their effects and actions may overlap. The actions required to create certain effects in a particular phase may well start prior to that phase.*

(a) Phase I (Deployment). *Timed phased deployment.*

(b) Phase II (Mission Operations/Seize the Initiative). *Include and prioritization CMO/CAO activities, as applicable, and the trigger(s) for when the phase/stage/parts are complete.*

1. Phase II Stage A

2. Phase II Stage B

(c) Phase III (Transition)

(2) Tasks. *List the tasks assigned to each element of the supported and supporting commands and agencies. Each task should be a concise statement of a mission to be performed and include all key elements required for CMO functions.*

c. **CMO Specific Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR)**. *See Basic Order. What are the reporting requirements for each CCIR?*

d. **Coordinating Instructions**. *List the instructions applicable to the whole command, two or more elements of the command, and the command, or its elements, and agencies external to the command, e.g., establishment of CA boundaries; liaison arrangements with allied forces and between subordinate commands; claims policies; application of SOFA; liaison and coordination with USG, NGOs, host nation, or other friendly countries, government and nongovernmental agencies; emergency measures for defense of civil populations; MISO support to CMO.*

4. **Administration and Logistics**. *Address any CMO/CAO administrative or logistical requirements*.

a. **Military Resource Requirements**. *Identify and applicable requirements for support CA to include contracted support. (Refer also to Annex D, Logistics).*

b. **Civilian Personnel**. *Estimate the local civilian labor required and available to support military operations. Refer also to Annex E, Personnel.*

c. **Civilian Facilities and Supplies**. *Estimate the local civilian facilities and supplies required and available to support the operation. Refer also to Annex D, Logistics.*

d**. Reports**. *Establish any necessary administrative reporting requirements.*

5. **Command and Control.** *Indicate the any difference between the command channels for the conduct of CA activities and the command relationships established in Annex J. Specify command responsibility for OPCON, ADCON, and logistics of CA activities and forces. Include any changes or transitions between the command and control organizations and the time of the expected shift. Identify all command arrangement agreements (MOUs) and those requiring development, and any necessary administrative reporting requirements.*

a. **Command**. See Annex J (Command Relationships). *Add any unique command relationships, location, and hierarchy for CA units/elements.*

b. **Signal**. See Annex K (Combat Information Systems).

# APPENDIX C

## COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

**Introduction**. Command is central to all military action, and unity of command is central to unity of effort. Inherent in command is the authority that a military Commander (CDR) lawfully exercises over subordinates including authority to assign missions and accountability for their successful completion. Although Commanders may delegate authority to accomplish missions, they may not absolve themselves of the responsibility for the attainment of these missions. Authority is never absolute; the establishing authority, directives, and the law will specify its extent.

The specific command relationship Table 1, (COCOM, OPCON, TACON, and support) will define the level of authority a Commander has over ***assigned*** or ***attached*** forces. A Commander can also have authority when coordinating authority, administrative control (ADCON), and direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH) relationships have been specified. A common misunderstanding with Marine Planners is the term "attached" it is not a command relationship, it describes how a force is coupled with another, the associated command relationship between those forces still needs to be defined.

A force assigned or attached to a combatant command (CCMD) may be transferred from that command to another combatant commander (CCDR) only when directed by the SecDef and under procedures prescribed by the SecDef and approved by the President. The SecDef specifies the command relationship the gaining Commander will exercise (and the losing CDR will relinquish). Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and JTFs may direct the assignment or attachment of their forces to those subordinate commands and delegate the command relationship as appropriate.

- Forces, not command relationships, are transferred between commands. When forces are transferred, the command relationship the gaining Commander will exercise (and the losing Commander will relinquish) over those forces must be specified.

- When transfer of forces to a joint force will be permanent (or for an unknown but long period of time) the forces should be reassigned. Combatant Commanders will exercise combatant command (command authority - COCOM), and subordinate joint force Commanders (JFCs), will exercise operational control (OPCON) over reassigned forces.
- When transfer of forces to a joint force will be temporary, the forces will be attached to the gaining command and JFCs, normally through the Service component Commander, will exercise OPCON over the attached forces.
- Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and joint task forces direct the assignment or attachment of their forces to those subordinate commands as appropriate.

**Combatant Command**. The command authority (COCOM) over assigned forces vested only in the Commanders of combatant commands by Title 10, USC, Section 164 (or as directed by the President in the Unified Command Plan [UCP]) and cannot be delegated or transferred. COCOM is the authority of a CCDR to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training (or in the case of USSOCOM, training of assigned forces), and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. COCOM should be exercised through the CDRs of subordinate organizations. Normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate JFCs and Service and/or FCCs functional component Commander. COCOM provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the CCDR considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions.

**Operational Control**. The command authority that may be exercised by Commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the SecDef must specify the command relationship the gaining Commander exercises (and the losing CDR will relinquish) over these forces. OPCON is inherent in COCOM and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military

operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. It should be exercised through the CDRs of subordinate organizations; normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate JFCs and Service and/or FCCs functional component Commanders. OPCON normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and employ those forces as the Commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. It does not include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. These elements of COCOM must be specifically delegated by the CCDR. OPCON does include the authority to delineate functional responsibilities and operational areas of subordinate JFCs.

**Tactical Control**. The command authority over assigned or attached forces, commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks.

**Support**. A command authority: a support relationship is established by a superior Commander between subordinate Commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. Commanders at any echelon may exercise support at or below the combatant command level. This includes the SecDef designating a support relationship between CCDRs as well as within a combatant command. The designation of supporting relationships is important as it conveys priorities to Commanders and staffs that are planning or executing joint operations. The support command relationship is, by design, a somewhat vague but very flexible arrangement. The establishing authority (the superior CDR) is responsible for ensuring that both the supported Commander and supporting Commanders understand the degree of authority that the supported Commander is granted.

An establishing directive normally is issued to specify the purpose of the support relationship, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken. It also should include:

- The forces and resources allocated to the supporting effort.
- The time, place, level, and duration of the supporting effort.
- The relative priority of the supporting effort.

- The authority, if any, of the supporting Commander to modify the supporting effort in the event of exceptional opportunity or an emergency.
- The degree of authority granted to the supported Commander over the supporting effort.

During the planning process, defining command relationships is extremely important for they define what a supported unit can do with the supporting force/capability, and what level of administrative and logistical support that unit needs to deliver to the supporting force/capability. Unless limited by the establishing directive, the supported Commander will have the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort. General direction includes the designation and prioritization of targets or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency.

**Types of Support**

- General Support. That support which is given to the supported force as a whole rather than to a particular subdivision thereof.
- Direct Support. A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force's request for assistance.
- Mutual Support. That support which units render each other against an enemy because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities.
- Close Support. That action of the supporting force against targets or objectives that are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with the fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force.

**Administrative Control**. The direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations with respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. ADCON is synonymous with administration and support responsibilities identified in Title 10, USC. This is the authority necessary to fulfill military department statutory responsibilities for administration and support.

ADCON may be delegated to and exercised by Commanders of Service forces assigned to a CCDR at any echelon at or below the level of Service component command. ADCON is subject to the command authority of CCDRs. ADCON may be delegated to and exercised by Commanders of Service commands assigned within Service authorities. Service Commanders exercising ADCON will not usurp the authorities assigned by a CCDR having COCOM over Commanders of assigned Service forces (Command Relationship Summary Figure A-1).

**Note**: OPCON & ADCON, if the GCE OpOrd attaches a CA Detachment to a subordinate Regiment, then the accompanying command relationships need to be outlined in the GCE OpOrd so that the Regiment knows its responsibilities and command authorities. The CMO Planner cannot be assigned to a higher command relationship than what currently exists. If the CA force is in a support relationship, the planner cannot plan to attach the force to a subordinate command with a higher command relationship such as TACON.

| Command Authority | Authority | How & Where Exercised | Restrictions | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| COCOM | (1) Organize & employ forces; (2) Assign tasks; (3) Designate objectives; (4) Operations; (5) Joint training; (6) issue logistics directives | Normally through subordinate joint force, service and/or functional component Commanders | Combatant Commanders only; cannot be delegated | Established by 10 USC 164; OPCON & TACON are inherent |
| OPCON | (1) Organize & employ forces; (2) Assign tasks; (3) Designate objectives; (4) Direct accomplishment of assigned missions; (5) Direct operations & joint training; (6) May be delegated | At any echelon at or below a combatant command; normally through subordinate Commanders | Does not include admin, logistics, discipline, internal organization or unit training | OPCON is inherent within COCOM; TACON is inherent within OPCON |
| TACON | Detailed direction and control of the movements or maneuvers of attached or assigned forces needed to accomplish assigned tasks or missions; may be delegated | At any echelon at or below a combatant command | No organizational or ADCON authority | TACON is inherent within OPCON |
| SUPPORT | To aid, protect, complement or sustain another force as directed by a higher command for a specified mission | Under a directive issued from a higher command | As prescribed by the higher command | This is a command relationship |
| ADCON | (1) Organization of service forces; (2) Control of resources/equipment; (3) Personnel management; (4) Unit & individual training plus readiness; (5) Mobilization & demobilization; (6) Discipline | Normally by Service or component Commanders directly over subordinate or other formations | Does not include any matters relating to operational missions | May be modified or restricted by COCOM authority. |
| Coordinating Authority | Coordinates specific functions or activities involving forces from two or more Services and/or joint force components or two or more elements from the same Service; can require the parties to consult each other | Normally used in connection with planning rather than operations. | Has no authority to compel agreement; if no agreement is reached, must refer to appointing authority | Establishes a consulting relationship, not command authority |
| DIRLAUTH | Authority granted by a Commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate with a command or agency outside the granting command. | Normally used in connection with planning rather than operations. | Granting Commander must be kept informed | Coordinating not a command relationship. |

**Table 1. Command Relationships**

# APPENDIX D

## OPERATION ASSESSMENT

**Introduction**. There are three major operational functions described in joint doctrine: plan, execute, and assess. These three operational functions are inseparable, planning is the basis for execution during which assessments are conducted to determine impact, how, and why MAGTF actions have changed the operational environment. Operation assessment results informs the commander's decision-making and command and control. Therefore, operation assessment must provide a clear intent and purpose to ascertain relevant feedback. Although, no assessment process should be viewed as perfect or free of any criticism, assessment is the least considered operational function and the least understood.

**Defining Operation Assessment**. Operation Assessment is a continuous process that supports decision making by measuring the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, achieving an objective, or attaining a desired end state. When conducted properly, operation assessment enables a shared understanding between decision makers and key stakeholders, enabling unity of effort and Tempo. Assessment is fundamental to an organization's ability to adapt. Generally, assessments:

- Occur at all echelons and levels of war
- Focus on commander's objectives and end state
- Orient on the future
- Reveal threats and opportunities
- Provide a basis for adaptation

**What is Operation Assessment?** Operation assessment is akin to top-down planning, it is a fundamental responsibility of the commander. An effective assessment plan focuses on the commander's objectives, desired end state, and critical information requirements. The commander's intent and guidance are essential to the effort and success of the assessment cell and/or staff. Operation assessment involves monitoring and analyzing changes in the OE, determining the most likely potential causes for those changes, identifying opportunities and

risks, and providing recommendations for improving operation or campaign performance to achieve objectives and end states.

**Assessment Planning Considerations**. Commanders will not always have the luxury of forming and training their staffs prior to an operational commitment. Therefore, it is often essential to direct the employment of staff energy in the early months of an operational commitment to defining necessary roles and developing necessary assessment processes. This investment will pay substantial dividends because operational commitments tend to evolve over time requiring commanders to make increasingly complex decisions. Operation assessment, like fires, is as much an art as it is science. There is no single way to conduct an assessment. Assessment occurs at all echelons and levels of war and applies to all aspects of the operation while considering all elements of the force as well as their warfighting functions (*Command and Control, Intelligence, Fires, Maneuver, Logistics, Force Protection, and information).*

Always start with the planning goals and/or desired outcomes in mind. Outcomes include: an end state, an objective, an effect, a task and purpose, a condition, a description of what success is and/or termination criterion; or anything else that specifies the change in the operating environment to be achieved. To get a more complete understanding of the OE, it is important to receive and share relevant information with the host nation, interagency, multinational, private sector, and nongovernmental partners. For an outcome to be executable, achievable, and assessable, it must be specific and bounded. One common way to bound outcomes is by unit size, geography, or time. Another way is to make them: specific, measurable, attainable, relevant and time bound.

**Develop an Assessment Approach**. Executing operation assessment involves developing a plan derived from the logical concept of the operations plan. Through operational design and MCPP, operations planners compartmentalize the OE in purpose, time, and space, which serves as the basis for the cell and/or staff to identify and develop measures, indicators, and (if meaningful) thresholds of success for each. The assessment plan must conform to the operation plan and adhere to HHQ's reporting and battle rhythm requirements. Operation Assessment is intended to answer the following questions:

- What happened?
- Why do we think it happened?
- So, what?
- What are the likely future opportunities and/or risks?
- What do we need to do?

Staffs and subordinate commands must tailor their support to the commander. They should be in tune with the commander's way of processing information, and understand how best to deliver analyses, assessments, and recommendations. It is also important to be familiar with the approved feedback mechanism for recommending or directing action.

**Develop the Assessment Plan**. Units must perform assessments within the resources at their disposal. The assessment plan guides application of the assessment activity to monitor, evaluate, and recommend and direct continuously throughout the operations process. It is important to recognize, as operational plans are iteratively adjusted and improved, the assessment plan must undergo review and revision to ensure alignment with the end state. Assessors must periodically readjust the assessment plan to avoid assessments becoming obsolete as understanding of adaptive and ill-structured systems increases. The assessment cell and/or staff must have a comprehensive understanding of the commander's goals and objectives, this knowledge aids in the development of the assessment framework:

- **Basis for Comparison** – Before changes in the OE can be observed, a baseline or initial an assessment is required. Understanding current and desired conditions and planning goals (commander's desired end state) developed during problem framing forms the basis for assessment plan development.
- **Analysis Process** – allows the cell and /or staff to identify trends and changes that can significantly impact the OE and the operation. Analysis seeks to identify positive or negative movement toward creating desired effects, achieving objectives, or attaining end states in the OE over time. Base on their analysis, the cell and/or staff estimates the effects (impact) of force's activities and resources allocation, determines whether forces have achieved their objectives, or have realized that a decision point has emerged. Using these determinations, the assessors may identify additional opportunities or risks.

Figure D-1. Assessment measures generally come in two varieties. Measures of performance (MOPs) are indications used to assess friendly actions tied to measuring task accomplishment. MOPs answer general questions, "Are we doing things, right?" and "Was the task completed to standard?" Measures of effectiveness (MOEs) are indications used to help measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time to gauge the achievement of objectives and end states or creation of effects. MOEs help answer the question, "Are we doing the right things to create the effects or desired change in the OE?"

| | Measure of Performance | Measure of Effectiveness |
|---|---|---|
| Quantitative | ▪ Number of schools built<br>▪ Number of inoculations given<br>▪ Number of police stations manned<br>▪ Number of gallons of water delivered | ▪ Literacy Rate (per/1000)<br>▪ Malaria rate (per/1000)<br>▪ Crime rate (%)<br>▪ Cases of dehydration / water-borne illness |
| Qualitative | ▪ Integration with IOs/NGOs programs<br>▪ Host nation perception of quality of work | ▪ Sentiment of the host nation population as to health and safety<br>▪ Police morale |

**Figure D-1. Quantitative Versus Qualitative Assessment**

Developing indicators that reflect the changes in the OE over time, that are pertinent to the operation is essential to an effective assessment process. In essence, assessors are asking specific series of questions about the OE and about the changes in the OE that the force is attempting to create. Indicators must be relevant, observable or collectable, responsive, and resourced. That is, they should not only answer the correct questions, but the important questions; collectable at reasonable cost in time, money, or manpower; change perceptively in a time frame relevant to the operation; and have resources available to collect them. Selected indicators must be well-specified such that they answer the information requirements (IRs) they are designed to answer. Any one indicator can be collected consistently by multiple observers, at different places or over time. Each will need a definition, a plan for collecting the data (who,

what, when, why, and how), and be sensitive to change within an appropriate time frame. This information and guidance should be formalized in the data collection plan.

- **Data Collection** - devising a collection process during planning is the key to its success, Figure D-2. Collecting and reporting changes in the OE are critical components of the assessment plan, not appropriately allocating collection resources places the quality of the assessment at risk. The assessment cell must advise the commander of risks and plausible enhancement measures such as reallocating resources or adjusting information requirements.

| Assessment Data Collection Plan | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Objective(s)** | **Effect(s)** | **Indicator(s)** | **Source** |
| Transition to civil governance: Establish civil conditions for host nation government to control | Protect critical infrastructure or cultural sites | Assessed damage to critical infrastructure or cultural sites per Annex G | Intel, CA, ACE, GCE, LCE |
| | Support Humanitarian assistance operations | Security conditions set to enable other organizations to assist population | GCE |
| | | Effective distribution of aid to designated location in the AO | Intel, CA, ACE, LCE |
| | | Number of reports of host nation government and personnel delivering aid | |

**Figure D-2. Assessment Data Collection Plan**

- **Recommendations** – An operation assessment is incomplete without facilitating and/or recommending future actions. An assessment should diagnose progress and effectiveness, unless it informs decision making, its use to the commander is limited. It is the assessment cell and staff's responsibility to organize the data, concisely communicate the assessment results, and provide recommendations to inform the commander's and/or stakeholder's future decisions. Recommendations to the commander may range from continuing the operation as planned, executing a branch plan, making unanticipated operation adjustments, or reprioritizing resources. As with any recommendation, the assessment cell and/or staff should address any future implications.

**Assessment Execution Framework**. The assessment model consists of four activities: monitoring the current situation to collect relevant information; submitting the data collection

requirements; evaluating assessment measures (MOEs and MOPs); and recommending and directing action to make operations more effective:

- **Monitor** – continuously observing conditions relevant to the current operation. Monitoring allows the force to collect necessary information and/or indicators within the operational environment as it exist to compare those responses against the forecasted planning goals described in the operation order. The assessment cell or staff cannot accurately judge progress and/or recommend adjustments to the commander without a comprehensive understanding of the current situation and the desired conditions, which serves as a baseline for the analysis process.
- **Feedback** - clearly established reporting requirements, delivery methods, and the frequency of delivery greatly increases the efficiency of the assessment process and provides the assessors more time to conduct analysis. Feedback comes from various sources and degrees of maturity. The role of the assessment cell and/or staff is to receive, validate, consolidate, analyze, correlate, synthesize, filter, and present relevant information to the commander.
- **Evaluate** – the assessment cell and/or staff will analyze specific information collected by the force to determine operational progress and likely future outcomes. Analysis seeks to identify movement toward creating desired effects, achieving objectives, or attaining end states. Analysis also identify trends and changes both positive and/or negative that significantly impact the OE and the MAGTF's operation. Assessment measures are used to measure the degree of achievement of the desired end state and to define why a current degree of progress exists, further analysis may be required to determine if corrective action(s) is necessary. The cell or staff estimates the effects of force employment and resource allocation; determines whether they have successfully achieved their objectives; or have realized that a decision point has emerged. Using these determinations, the assessment cell and/or staff may identify additional opportunities or risks.
- **Recommendation** - the assessment cell or staff work is incomplete without recommending or proposing actions to increase operational effectiveness. In addition to interpreting information into meaningful recommendations, the assessment cell and/or staff should inform the commander of future opportunities and risks to mission success

including their likelihood and impact. The cell will construct possible changes to the plan for the commander's approval and implementation guidance. Proposed recommendations may include, but are not limited to:

- Update, change, add, or remove critical assumptions.
- Transition between phases, stages, parts, steps (as appropriate).
- Execute branches or sequels.
- Change resource allocation and/or priorities of effort.
- Adjust end states, operation orders, objectives, and priorities.

**Assessment Presentation Product**. An assessment product is used to summarize all assessment inputs into a coherent presentation. Techniques for communicating the assessment may vary by the level of command, type of operation, the commander's preference for displaying information or HHQ's mandated reporting formats. An effective assessment product must effectively communicate the assessment findings and recommendations, and their implications on future operations to the commander. Figure D-3., provides an example of an assessment presentation product.

| LOO: FHA | |
|---|---|
| BN Objective: | Potable Water Available |
| Essential Tasks: | 1. Drill Well |
| | 2. Publicize Coalition Efforts |
| Desired Effect: | Local populace does not support the insurgents |
| Progress: | Contract signed; locals hired; construction underway |
| | Locals providing actionable intelligence |
| Assessment: | Adaptive insurgents continue to leverage unemployed workers in Village X thus threatening the security situation. |
| Recommendations: | Maintain continuous presence in Village X. Pursue additional Essential Services contracts using local labor. Continue periodic operations in conjunction with HN forces to maintain initiative. |

Figure D-3. Assessment Presentation Product

**Commanders Guidance**. After the assessment cell and/or staff have provided recommendations to the commander. The commander provides additional guidance, to include unanticipated operational adjustments, or reprioritizing resources. If necessary, updates or modifications are made to the assessment plan. Then the assessment process begins again based on the new guidance until the desired end state is met.

# APPENDIX E

## POPULATION-ORIENTED TACTICAL TASKS

**Introduction.** The MAGTF tactical tasks may be specified, implied, or essential. They define actions commanders may take to accomplish their missions. In special circumstances, commanders may modify tasks to meet METT-T requirements. They must clearly state that they are departing from the standard meaning of these tasks. One way this can be done is by prefacing the modified task with the statement, "What I mean by [modified task] is . . .." Tactical tasks are assigned based on capabilities. CA can execute those tactical tasks essential for it to influence the civil environment and to support civil-military operations.

The following tactical tasks focus friendly efforts on achieving some sort of condition as it relates to the population within the area of operations.

**Advise:** To improve the individual and unit capabilities and capacities of host nation security forces through the development of personal and professional relationships between United States and host nation forces.

**Assess the Population:** To evaluate the nature, situation, and attitudes of a designated population or elements of a population, inhabiting the area of operations.

**Assist:** To provide designated support or sustainment capabilities to host nation security forces to enable them to accomplish their objectives.

**Build/Restore Infrastructure:** To construct, rebuild, or repair local infrastructure to support the host nation and gain or maintain the cooperation of the local population.

**Contain:** To prevent or halt elements of a population or designated party from departing or projecting physical influence beyond a defined area. See also enemy-oriented tactical tasks.

**Control:** To use physical control measures and information-related capabilities to influence elements of a population or designated actors to respond as desired. See also terrain-oriented tactical tasks.

**Coordinate with Civil Authorities:** To interact with, maintain communication, and harmonize friendly military activities with those of other interorganizational agencies and coalition partners to achieve unity of effort.

**Cordon:** To temporarily prevent movement to or from a prescribed area such as a neighborhood, city block, series of buildings, or another feature. See also terrain-oriented tactical tasks.

**Enable Civil Authorities:** To support or assist the host nation government and designated interorganizational agencies in providing effective governance.

**Exclude:** To prevent or halt elements of a population or designated party from entering or projecting physical influence into a defined area.

**Influence:** To persuade the local population, including potential and known adversaries, within the operational area to support, cooperate with, or at least accept the friendly force presence, and dissuade the local population from interfering with operations. See also enemy-oriented tactical tasks.

**Occupy:** To move onto an objective, key terrain, or other manmade or natural area without opposition and control the entire area. See also terrain-oriented tactical tasks.

**Reconnoiter:** To obtain, by visual observation or other methods, information about civil considerations. See also enemy- and terrain-oriented tactical tasks.

**Secure:** To gain possession of a position, terrain feature, piece of infrastructure, or civil asset, with or without force, and prevent its destruction or loss by enemy action. See also terrain-oriented tactical tasks.

**Train:** To teach designated skills or behaviors to improve the individual and unit capabilities and capacities of host nation security forces.

**Transition to Civil Control:** The handover of civil government and security responsibilities from friendly force military authorities to legitimate civil authorities.

While not doctrinally defined it is important that tasks provide clear guidance. The following are examples of modified tasks.

- **Allow:** To permit something to happen or exist.
- **Create:** To cause to happen; bring about; arrange, as by intention or design.
- **Enable:** To make able; give power, means, competence, or ability to; authorize.
- **Facilitate:** To assist the progress of.
- **Prevent:** To keep from occurring.
- **Support:** A person or thing that gives aid or assistance.

# APPENDIX F

## CMO PLANNERS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

*"As a lifetime serial learner, I have found that ordinary people can do the extraordinary who are committed to experiential learning, are intellectually curious, and possess an unquenchable desire to acquire new knowledge . . . this may be our only advantage in the future fight."*

*—BGen Lorna M. Mahlock*

*"A smooth sea never made a skilled sailor."*

*—President Franklin Delano Roosevelt*

Plans are based on command decision and generating succeeding decisions at lower levels of command. In each instance, decisions are reached by a commander's estimate of the situation and their ability to develop creative options to solving the problem. CMO planners advise MAGTF commanders and their staff on the conduct of CMO and CAO, as well as understanding civil conditions to support operations. CMO planners must be prepared to contribute to any OPT's as the CMO SME, while be thoroughly familiar with the MCPP. CMO planners must also provide a clear understanding of the possible effects of the MAGTF's actions in the civil operating environment. Most importantly, the CMO planner must consider not only the first order desired effects of lethal fires, non-lethal fires, and military action, but also possible second and third order effects including undesired ones. The CMO planner must ensure CMO plans are resolute, relevant, and broad enough to allow flexibility in implementation, and must possess sufficient details to increase prospects for a successful mission.

CMO planners directly supports the OPT and aides the commander's decision making by:

- Providing an increased understanding of the civil operational environment and integrating insights from a civil prospective into the planning conducted by the OPT and staff.
- Advising the OPT and staff about CA capabilities, limitations, and shortfalls.
- Participating in the design dialog, brainstorming, identifying problems, discuss concerns, and thinking beyond a CA detachment level.
- Analyzing the civil operational environment, capable of producing a CMO staff estimate.

- Effectively integrating staff requirements, using interpersonal skills to interact with other staff members, and synchronizing efforts with IRCs to leverage capabilities and maximize effects.

CMO planners participate in, and often lead, the CMO working group. CMO working groups are standing working groups formed to integrate additional staff members and increase CMO planning effectiveness. CMO planners must anticipate the needs of the OPT and the tasks within the staff section to provide information and products on time, and in the correct format. Additionally, CMO planners must synthesize and harmonize, when applicable, all input from the CMO working group so the other members of the OPT understands operationally relevant civil information.

Prior to the OPT convening, CMO planners must be prepared to think at the commander's level. Know the issues that will be of concern at HHQ. It is essential for CMO planners to be informed:

- Study pertinent orders, directives, and guidance to increase situational awareness and big picture understanding.
- Read HHQ orders and annexes (at a minimum: Annex A Task Organization, Annex D Logistics, Annex G Civil-Military Operations, Annex K Communications, and Annex V Interagency).
- Coordinate with other information related capabilities (IRC) (e.g., MISO, COMMSTRAT) to ensure a common set of TTPs and to maximize information sharing.
- Research U.S. embassy, security cooperation programs, and provincial reconstruction team (PRT) plans and guidance, as applicable.
- Identify helpful resources and interagency documents, such as national and regional guidance provided by DoS and USAID.
- Review recent lessons learned and or after-action reports (AAR).
- Seek Center for Regional and Security Studies (CRSS) SME support and guidance.

Once the OPT is convened, CMO planners must be prepared to provide specific knowledge to the staff, in addition to supporting, adjacent commands, and other governmental agencies. It is essential that CMO planners be properly trained and able to:

- Integrate civil considerations into the planning process, including stabilization planning.
- Develop a CPB and provide civil considerations into the IPB.
- Participate, as well as lead the green cell to depict population reactions to friendly and adversary actions during wargaming.
- Produce a staff estimate and Annex G.
- Lead a CMO Working Group.
- Determine the need to establish a fixed or mobile CMOC, including how many, potential locations, and the communication requirements.
- Determine the CIM system to be utilized and register information exchange requirements (C2 applications and systems e.g., MARCIMS, Share Point) with the IMO.
- Communicate and coordinate with interagency, host nation, international, nongovernmental personnel.

Moreover, a CMO planner must be able to provide a targeted, planned, and coordinated observations and evaluations of specific civil aspects of the operating environment. CMO planners must be proactive. This normally involves advanced and proper planning and preparation to be ready to act when necessary or most advantageous, and not merely to react to developments. The modern CMO planner must develop fundamental cognitive competencies such as framing a problem, mental imaging, critical thinking, analysis, synthesis, reasoning, and problem solving to make effective decisions more quickly in a time-constrained environment, when they often have incomplete, inaccurate, or even contradictory information.

# GLOSSARY

## SECTION I. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AO ..... area of operations

ASCOPE ..... areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events

CA ..... civil affairs

CAG ..... civil affairs group

CAO .....civil affairs operations

CAT..... civil affairs team

CCDR ..... combatant commander

CCMD ..... combatant command (organization)

CIM ..... civil information management

CIMIC ..... civil-military cooperation

CJCSI ..... Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff instruction

CME ..... civil-military engagement

CMO ..... civil-military operations

CMOC ..... civil-military operations center

CMOWG ..... civil-military operations working group

COA ..... course of action

COCOM ..... combatant command (authority)

COM ..... chief of mission

CONOPS ..... concept of operations

COP ..... common operational picture

COS ..... chief of staff

CPB ..... civil preparation of the battlespace

DC ..... dislocated civilian

DOD ..... Department of Defense

DODD..... Department of Defense directive

DODI..... Department of Defense instruction

DOS..... Department of State

DSCA..... defense support of civil authorities

FHA..... foreign humanitarian assistance

FID .....foreign internal defense

G-2 ..... brigade or higher intelligence staff office

G-3 ..... brigade or higher operations staff office

G-5 ..... assistant chief of staff, plans

G-9 ..... brigade or higher civil-military operations staff officer

GCE..... ground combat element

HACC ..... humanitarian assistance coordination center

HN ..... host nation

HOC ..... humanitarian operations center

HQ ..... headquarters

ICRC ..... International Committee of the Red Cross

IE ..... information environment

IO ..... international organizations

IOWG ..... information operations working group

IPB ..... intelligence preparation of the battlespace

IPI ..... indigenous populations and institutions

IRC ..... information-related capability

J-9 ..... civil-military operations directorate of a joint staff; civil-military operations staff section

JIACG ..... joint interagency coordination group

JPP ..... joint planning process

JP ..... joint publication

JTF .....joint task force

LNO..... liaison officers

MAF..... Marine amphibious force

MAGTF..... Marine air-ground task force

MARCIMS ..... Marine civil information management system

MARFORRES ..... United States Marine Corps Forces Reserve

MCCMOS..... Marine Corps Civil-Military Operations School

MCDP ..... Marine Corps doctrinal publication

MCPP ..... Marine Corps planning process

MCWP ..... Marine Corps warfighting publication

MEB ..... Marine expeditionary brigade

MEF ..... Marine expeditionary force

METT-T ..... mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available

MEU ..... Marine expeditionary unit

MISO ..... Military Information Support Operation

MOE ..... measure of effectiveness

MOS ..... military occupational specialty

NCO ..... Noncommissioned Officer

NEO ..... noncombatant evacuation operation

NGO ..... nongovernmental organization

PMESII ..... political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure

PRC ..... populace and resources control

PSYOP .....psychological operations (forces)

R2P2 ..... rapid response planning process

RLT ..... regimental landing team

S-3 ..... battalion or regiment operations section

SAF ..... Stability Assessment Framework

SC ..... security cooperation

SCA ..... support to civil administration

SMEAC ..... situation, mission, execution, administrative and logistics, command and signal

SNA ..... social network analysis

SPMAGTF ..... special purpose Marine air-ground task force

SOF ..... special operation forces

UN ..... United Nations

UNHCR..... United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

US ..... United States

USC ..... United States code

USAID ..... United States Agency for International Development

USG..... United States Government

## Section II. Definitions

**adversary**-A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged. (DOD Dictionary)

**assessment**—Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. (Part 2 of a 4-part definition.) (DOD Dictionary)

**assumption**-A supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander in the process of planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of action. (DOD Dictionary)

**branch**-The contingency options built into the base plan used for changing the mission, orientation, or direction of movement of a force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions. (DOD Dictionary)

**chief of mission**—The principal officer (the ambassador) in charge of a diplomatic facility of the United States, including any individual assigned to be temporarily in charge of such a facility. The chief of mission is the personal representative of the President to the country of accreditation. The chief of mission is responsible for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all US Government executive branch employees in that country (except those under the command of a US area military commander). The security of the diplomatic post is the chief of mission's direct responsibility. Also called COM. (DOD Dictionary)

**civil administration**—An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. (DOD Dictionary)

**civil affairs**—Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations. Also called **CA**. See also **civil-military operations**. (DOD Dictionary)

**civil affairs group**—A Reserve Component organization supporting the MAGTF commander with specially trained and organized personnel in order to facilitate the planning, coordination and execution of CMO and limited civil affairs operations. Also called **CAG**. (Note to terminologist: There is no Joint or Marine Corps definition of a CAG. Definition was derived from MCRP 5-12D and MCTP 3-03.A)

**civil affairs operations**— Actions planned, coordinated, executed, and assessed to enhance awareness of, and manage the interaction with, the civil component of the operational

environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; and/or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government. Also called **CAO**. (DOD Dictionary)

**civil information management**— Process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and internally fused with the supported element, higher headquarters, other US Government and Department of Defense agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations to ensure the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to military and nonmilitary partners throughout the area of operations. Also called **CIM** (MCRP 1-10.2)

**civil-military operations**— Activities of a commander performed by designated military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions by directly supporting the achievement of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. Also called **CMO**. See also **civil affairs operations**. (DOD Dictionary)

**civil-military operations center**—An organization, normally comprised of civil affairs, established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States within indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the joint force commander. Also called **CMOC**. See also **civil-military operations**. (DOD Dictionary)

**civil-military operations chief**-MOS 0539 assists in the planning, coordinating, and assessment CAO and CMO. These Staff Noncommissioned Officers assist in advising MAGTF commanders and their staff sections on the conduct of CMO as well as in understanding and shaping civil conditions to support MAGTF operations. CMO Chiefs assist with integrating CMO into MCPP across the competition continuum. CMO Chiefs assist in the development of green cell products as well as coordinate, plan and assist in the developing an Annex G supporting a MAGTF or joint task force (JTF) operation plan or operations order.

**civil-military operations planner**-MOS 0535 plans, coordinates, and assesses CMO and CAO. These officers advise MAGTF commanders and their staff sections on the conduct of CMO and CAO as well as in understanding and shaping civil conditions to support MAGTF operations. CMO Planners integrate CMO into MCPP across the competition continuum. CMO Planners develop Green Cell products and coordinate, plan and develop an Annex G supporting a MAGTF or JTF Operation Plan or Operations Order.

**civil-military operations working group**- a task-organized planning entity that supports the G-9's (or other staff lead's) or the CMO planner's CMO planning requirements and responsibilities. It consists of CA personnel and situation relevant SMEs. The CMOWG conducts Civil Preparation of the Battlespace, prepares Civil Information Management-related products for the assigned area of operations, develops the CMO Staff Estimate, creates the CMO Concept of Support, supports production of Annex G (Civil-Military Operations) and related appendices, and examines/resolves issues, concerns, or problems as directed by the G-9 or CMO Planner.

**civil preparation of the battlespace**—An analytical method used to examine civil considerations in support of mission analysis and the overall IPB process. Civil preparation of the battlespace is conducted through the framework of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations in order to focus on civil aspects as it relates to the overall operational environment and mission accomplishment. Civil preparation of the battlespace uses myriad methods to specifically analyze different aspects of civil information and assess the civil impact of friendly, adversary, external actors, as well as the local populace, on MAGTF operations and the achievement of objectives. Also called **CPB**. (Note to terminologist: in an effort to illustrate the difference in focus area between intelligence planners and CMO Planners, the writers feel the introduction of the term civil preparation of the battlespace is warranted and should be included in this publication and the Marine Corps lexicon of terms.)

**civil reconnaissance**—A targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the environment such as areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, or events. Also called **CR**. (DOD Dictionary)

**commander's operational approach**-An expression of what the commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. This visualization reflects the commander's understanding of the situation and hypothesis for achieving the overall purpose.

**common operational picture**—A single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command that facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. Also called **COP**. (DOD Dictionary)

**dislocated civilian**—A broad term primarily used by the Department of Defense that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. Also called **DC**. (DOD Dictionary)

**effect**-The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. (Part 2 of a 3-part definition) (DOD Dictionary)

**endstate**-The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives. (JP 3-0)

**foreign assistance**—Assistance to foreign nations ranging from the sale of military equipment and support for foreign internal defense to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and man-made disasters that may be provided through development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance. See also **foreign humanitarian assistance, security assistance.** (DOD Dictionary)

**foreign humanitarian assistance**—Department of Defense activities conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. Also called **FHA**. See also **foreign assistance**. (DOD Dictionary)

**foreign internal defense**—Participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or international organizations in any of the programs and activities undertaken by a host nation government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called **FID**. (DOD Dictionary)

**host nation**—A nation which receives forces and/or supplies from allied nations and/or North Atlantic Treaty Organization to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called **HN**. (DOD Dictionary)

**indicator-**A specific piece of information that infers the condition, state, or existence of something, and provides a reliable means to ascertain performance or effectiveness.

**indigenous populations and institutions**— The societal framework of an operational environment including citizens; legal and illegal immigrants; dislocated civilians; and governmental, tribal, ethnic, religious, commercial, and private organizations and entities. Also called **IPI**. (DOD Dictionary)

**information operations**— The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. Also called **IO**. (DOD Dictionary)

**interagency**—Of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. (DOD Dictionary)

**internally displaced person**— Any person who has been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their home or places of habitual residence, in particular, as a result of or to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters and who has not crossed an internationally recognized state border. Also called **IDP**. (DOD Dictionary)

**limitations**-An action required or prohibited by higher authority, such as a constraint or a restraint, and other restrictions that limit the commander's freedom of action, such as diplomatic agreements, rules of engagement, political and economic conditions in affected countries, and host nation issues. (DOD Dictionary)

**measures of effectiveness (MOE)**-An indicator used to measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time. (DOD Dictionary)

**measures of performance (MOP)**-An indicator used to measure a friendly action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. (DOD Dictionary)

**nongovernmental organization**— A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or

encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called **NGO**. (DOD Dictionary)

**operational context**-The interrelated conditions in which something exists or occurs. (Merriam-Webster)

**operational planning team**—A group built around the future operations section which integrates the staff representatives and resources. The operational planning team may have representatives or augmentation from each of the standard staff sections, the seven warfighting functions, staff liaisons, and/or subject matter experts. Also called OPT. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**populace and resources control**—Control measures that assist host nation governments or de facto authorities in retaining control over their population centers, thus precluding complicating problems that may hinder joint mission accomplishment. Populace and resources control measures seek to identify, reduce, relocate, or access population resources that may impede or otherwise threaten joint operation success. Also called **PRC**. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**private sector**—An umbrella term that may be applied to any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected nongovernmental organizations. (DOD Dictionary)

**resource shortfalls-**The lack of forces, equipment, materiel, or capability reflected as the difference between the resources identified as a plan requirement and those quantities identified as apportioned for planning that would adversely affect the command's ability to accomplish its mission. (JP 5-0)

**rule of law**—A principle of governance in which all persons and institutions, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly announced, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and consistent with international human rights norms and standards. The drafting of laws must be transparent, and they must be applied fairly and without arbitrariness. In addition, all persons must have access to justice—the ability to seek and obtain a remedy through informal or formal institutions of justice. (Note to terminologist: The Handbook for Military Support to Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform, published 13 June 2011, discusses this on page I-3. The above definition is derived from the Joint Handbook)

**security assistance**— Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended; or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, lease, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives, and those that are funded and authorized through the Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency are considered part of security cooperation. Also called **SA**. See also **security cooperation**. (DOD Dictionary)

**security cooperation**— All Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and

multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. Also called **SC**. See also **security assistance**. (DOD Dictionary)

**sequel-**The subsequent operation or phase based on the possible outcomes of the current operation or phase.

**sequencing-** the arrangement of actions in an order producing the effects for the generation of decisive conditions.

**support to civil administration**— Actions that helps continue or stabilize management by a governing body of a foreign nation's civil structure by assisting an established government or by establishing military authority over an occupied population. Support to civil administration consists of planning, coordinating, advising, or assisting with those activities that reinforce or restore a civil administration that supports US and multinational objectives. Also called **SCA**. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**unity of effort**—Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action. (DOD Dictionary)

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